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Since the inception of the United States Department of Homeland Security, the American 
public has been told that it has a prominent role to play in the “War on Terror.”  
However, this role has not been clearly defined. This thesis explores the viability of 
community engagement as a tool to promote public safety and homeland security. 
Research was primarily conducted through a literature review (to understand how 
engagement impacts safety), and a comparison of four case studies of safety-centric 
engagement programs in the U.S. and United Kingdom. While several of the programs in 
the case studies have proven to be effective at developing trust and improving security, 
the U.S. federal government has not effectively worked with these resources to improve 
its understanding of the domestic security landscape. This thesis contends that a new 
system is necessary to connect the federal government to local engagement programs. 
This may be accomplished with a domestic coordination and engagement system, 
referred to as the “Rising System” for the purposes of this thesis. The goal of the Rising 
System would be threefold: To link federal, state, and local governments; to build on 
existing community policing and outreach efforts to help at-risk communities identify 
their greatest challenges; and to provide a forum where community members can safely 
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There is nothing more dangerous than to build a society with a large 
segment of people in that society who feel that they have no stake in it; 
who feel that that have nothing to lose. People who have stake in their 
society, protect that society, but when they don't have it, they 
unconsciously want to destroy it. 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Since the inception of the United States Department of Homeland Security, the 
American public has been told that it has a prominent role to play in the “War on Terror.” 
National security, homeland security, and counterterrorism strategy documents released 
in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 20111 have treated the role of the individual American citizen in 
different contexts, but each document is based on the idea that while government action 
can achieve some successes in our collective defense, the engagement of individuals and 
communities is imperative to providing for a homeland that is truly secure. One of these 
documents, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) describes a need to “assist, 
engage, and connect communities to increase their collective resilience.”2  However, the 
role of the community has not been clearly defined.  
This thesis explored the notion of community engagement, particularly in the 
context of how outreach may be effectively coordinated by the federal government. The 
initial research (found in the literature review) focused on determining the effectiveness  
 
 
                                                 
1 See: Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (2002), Homeland 
Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (2007), Office of the President of the United 
States, National Security Strategy, (2010), US Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, (2010), Office of the President of 
the United States, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2011), and , Office of the President of the 
United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (August 
2011), and Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (December 2011).  




of community engagement as a public safety tool. The research concluded that for a 
variety of reasons, engaging communities can make them more resilient, both from a 
public safety and homeland security perspective.  
With the effectiveness of engagement established, the research shifted to 
analyzing existing citizen engagement programs that have proven to be successful in 
various ways. Three such programs were conducted by municipal governments in the 
U.S., and a fourth was the counterterrorism strategy of the United Kingdom, Prevent. 
These cases have three commonalities in their strategies that contribute to their success:  
how they defined the community to be engaged, the tactics they used to engage residents, 
and how they allocate funding and resources.  
The knowledge gained from the literature review and case studies was then 
applied to the primary contribution of this thesis, a proposal for a U.S. federal 
engagement strategy, here called the “Rising System.” The strategy behind the Rising 
System is based on consolidating responsibility for federal engagement activities, and 
then providing liaisons to interact with local engagement activities already in place 
throughout the U.S. By utilizing existing engagement programs, the Rising System 
allows the federal government to benefit from the trust already established by local 
governments with their communities, often through community policing efforts.  
The Rising System is also based in the idea that by listening to the public and 
engaging in activities that present an opportunity for bi-directional information flow, the 
federal government will gain insight to local communities that facilitates more effective 
service delivery. The role of the public in this model is to speak with the government, and 
participate in discussions on both a tactical and policy level about safety and security in 
their communities. The Rising System provides a vehicle to begin these conversations.  
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
There are myriad of ways to describe a “community.” Communities may be 




socioeconomic characteristics.3 Therefore, guidance from the United States (U.S.) federal 
government on “community participation” and involvement, as found in several national 
strategy and homeland security documents, 4 is vague.  
Despite which criteria are used to describe a community, some communities are 
evaluated to be at higher risk for public safety and homeland security issues than others.5  
Underserved communities, those with high levels of crime, poor quality of life, and 
limited access to government services, are among those that may be considered “high-
risk.” They are similar to communities described by Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt as 
“anomic.”6  These communities are the least likely to: be self-sufficient; be prepared to 
prevent or respond to homeland security issues ranging from domestic radicalization to 
large-scale emergency response; be informed about available public services; or trust 
government.7 Residents who find themselves not receiving their “fair share” of 
government services may also be more likely to take violent actions against their 
government and society.8     
Engagement, the active solicitation of community members to participate in 
government decision-making processes, can serve as a tool to improve governments’ 
understanding of these high-risk communities, and to improve their relationship with 
                                                 
3 Athol Yates, “Community involvement in national security: An essential but difficult task,” National 
Security Practice Notes (August 2005), accessed July 16, 2011, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org.au/files/NSPN_Community_engagement.pdf. 
4 See: Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (2002), Homeland 
Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (2007), Office of the President of the United 
States, National Security Strategy, (2010), US Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, (2010), Office of the President of 
the United States, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2011), Office of the President of the 
United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (August 
2011), and Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (December 2011).  
5 Nolan, J., Conti, N., and McDevitt, J. “Situational Policing:  Neighbourhood Development and 
Crime Control.” Policing & Society, 14, 2 (June 2004), 99–117. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security: Advancing the 
Homeland Security Paradigm,” Homeland Security Affairs, V, No.2 (May 2009), accessed July 10, 2011, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=109866&coll=limited. 
8 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 




residents. Several municipalities across the U.S. and abroad have effectively used 
engagement to develop grass-roots strategies that improved quality of life and security.  
While the U.S. federal government recognizes engagement as an important aspect 
of homeland security,9 the government provides little effective guidance on how that 
engagement should take place, or who should be responsible for the engagement. This 
thesis proposes that if the federal government uses successful local engagement models to 
build trust with communities, residents will respond by taking greater ownership of the 
areas around their homes, with the potential to improve both their quality of life and 
public safety.10  Once communities achieve an improved collective efficacy,11 they 
should have developed a trusting relationship with (at least) their local government, if not 
their state and federal counterparts. Communities should understand how to access 
services critical to improving their neighborhood, and gradually see an increase in quality 
of life as they actively participate to improve their neighborhood and shed the label 
“underserved.” Communities that accomplish these goals may be safer and more vibrant, 
and the government will enjoy a more thorough knowledge and appreciation of the 
dynamics of the neighborhood. This thesis proposes that appropriate government 
engagement strategies can provide the vehicle to creating more “strong” (low crime, high 
efficacy) communities. This thesis explores the qualities, benefits, and some models of 
engagement, and recommends an engagement strategy for the U.S. federal government.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local 
citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer?  
1. How can engagement be used to build resilience and trust? 
                                                 
9 Office of the President of the United States Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States (August 2011) and Office of the President of the United States, Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(December 2011). 
10 Nolan, et al., “Situational Policing.”  
11 As defined by Nolan, et al., “the cohesion among residents combined with shared expectations for 




2. With limited resources, engagement strategies must be focused on areas 
where they will have the most significant impact. How can the 
government identify areas that are high-risk for crime or terrorism? 
3. What specialties or resources are needed to conduct an effective 
engagement process? 
4. What aspects of engagement might help counter the terrorist narrative 
preventing individuals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations? 
5. How can engagement change the behavior of potentially dangerous 
individuals?   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature review conducted for this thesis examined research surrounding 
some of the underlying concepts described in the research questions and problem space. 
The review is divided into three sections:  “What We Might Know,” “What We Haven’t 
Figured Out Yet,” and “What We Need to Know.”  “What We Might Know” explores the 
difficulties of defining the term “community,” examines the role some governments have 
taken in engagement activities, discusses the impact that engagement can have on 
communities, and reviews some of the U.S. federal government’s existing engagement 
operations. The literature in “What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet” discusses the 
importance of establishing “social trust,”12 and how that can be facilitated through the 
development of strategies that empower bottom-up decision making and by enhancing 
what social psychologists refer to as procedural justice. The “What We Need to Know” 
category explores gaps in U.S. federal engagement processes, and the lack of a 
comprehensive engagement strategy.     
1. What We Might Know  
Throughout the literature reviewed for this thesis, the definition of “resilience” is 
generally accepted as the ability of a community to withstand and recover from disruptive 
                                                 
12 As described in Robert Bach, Robert Doran, Laura Gibb, David Kaufman, and Kathy Settle, “Policy 
Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience,” presented initially at the London Workshop of the 





events.13  Resilience is consistently seen as an important quality for communities to 
possess. Communities with this quality are understood to be better prepared to respond to 
an emergency, and to recover faster after disaster strikes.14   
How, then, do communities become resilient? The literature reveals that resiliency 
is the product of several factors, including location, economic standing, and available 
resources.15  However, one factor has stood prominently in several U.S. national security 
and counterterrorism-focused documents—engagement. The definition of engagement, 
however, varies considerably, and manifests itself in different ways with different 
strategies. Engagement strategies reflect the definition of the audience to be engaged, the 
government’s understanding of its role in the process, and how the engagement itself is 
conducted. For the works reviewed here, engagement (like resiliency) was viewed 
universally as a positive action, though opinions on its effectiveness varied. These 
analyses are discussed further in the “What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet” section. One 
publication referred to engagement as the “most important element in further enhancing 
national security.”16  The details of what engagement entails, however, are frequently left 
out.    
2. Defining “Community” 
Discrepancies about strategies for engagement begin with the understanding that 
the U.S. is composed of a wide variety of communities. The first point to be clarified is 
the parameter of what defines a community. Communities may be geographic areas, 
ethnic groups, interest groups, extended families, or those sharing socioeconomic 
characteristics.17  Engagement strategies for each of these groups require different tactics. 
                                                 
13 Patricia H. Longstaff, Nicholas J. Armstrong, Keli Perrin, Whitney May Parker, and Matthew 
Hidek, “Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for Assessment,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, VI, No.3 (Sept. 2010) 3, accessed July 16, 2011, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=130533&coll=limited.    
14 Cabinet Office, Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for communities (March 2011). Accessed July 
16, 2011, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PFE-Guide-for-Communities_0.pdf.  
15 Longstaff, “Building Resilient Communities,” 4.  





The literature concludes that no single type of program or initiative will be successful in 
all of these environments;18 customized plans will need to be drawn for each community.  
Defining the audience to be engaged becomes the first task in creating an 
engagement program. The City of Philadelphia, for instance, focuses its engagement 
activities on small, geographically-bound communities. Other programs, like the New 
York Police Department’s Community Affairs Bureau focus on groups based on 
ethnicity, religion, and sports leagues.19 
3. Conducting Engagement Activities 
While simply interacting with the public is a start, studies show that the public has 
a desire for more meaningful conversations in many communities.20  The first priority of 
many communities is to feel safe.21  Feeling safe and statistically being safe may be 
interpreted differently. Many cities measure their safety by the number of violent crimes 
reported through Uniform Crime Reports.22  Feeling safe, however, may not correlate 
with statistics on being safe. While avoiding direct confrontation with violent crime is an 
obvious aspect to feeling safe, the impression includes freedom from harassment, 
nuisances, and street crime.23  Statistics on safety perception may not be readily available 
with statistics, but it can be understood by working with residents. Margaret Camina’s 
research indicates that residents are also willing to participate in engagement processes if 
they believe that officials are listening to them, and that conditions are improving.24  If 
conducted properly, this can become a self-perpetuating cycle of government listening to 
                                                 
18 Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”  
19 Brian Fishman and Andrew Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization: Lessons for 
Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach” (New America Foundation: 2011), accessed July 23, 
2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/countering_domestic_radicalization.  
20 Margaret Camina, Understanding and Engaging Deprived Communities (London : Home Office, 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Communication Development Unit, 2004). 
21 Ibid. 
22 For more information, see “FBI – Uniform Crime Reports,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
accessed July 16, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr.  





residents, conditions improving as a result of better information about neighborhoods, 
and deeper engagement by residents as their communities become more vibrant.    
The literature also reveals a number of methods for interaction with community 
members. Some methods take the approach of traditional “grass-roots” organizations—
knocking on doors, sponsoring events, and meeting with existing neighborhood 
organizations.25  Others take recently developed initiatives and build on them, such as 
outreach through relationships established in community policing efforts or involving ex- 
offenders in analyzing gun violence data.26  Metrics to determine which methods are 
most effective are sparse, and when they do exist, they are often inconsistent. The 
common theme that emerges from the literature is that the use of outreach methods is 
necessary, and that each group/community will be different, and thus requires a different 
approach.27 
The work of Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt28 further support the need to customize 
approaches for communities. The authors suggest that there is a direct correlation 
between the level of crime in a community and the degree to which members of that 
community are effectively organized. They place neighborhoods in one of four types—
Strong (low crime and high organization), Vulnerable (low crime and low organization), 
Anomic (high crime and low organization) or Responsive (high crime and high 
organization).  
According to their analysis, tactics for promoting general public safety need to be 
geared toward moving communities in a positive direction for both factors (lower crime 
and increase organization). For the community policing process to be effective, those 
conducting the engagement must first understand the condition of the community before  
 
                                                 
25 Institute for Law and Justice, “Engaging the Community in Project Safe Neighborhoods” (October 
2005), Prepared for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, accessed July 16, 2011, 
http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/PSN_CE_Monograph_FINAL.pdf.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Yates, “Community Involvement in National Security.” 




developing an engagement plan. Once this “community profile” is identified, a 
customized goal and action plan may be developed to bring the community to the desired 
level.  
In addition to requiring customized plans, the literature notes that engagement 
should not be restricted to any single type of community, regardless of how the 
community is defined. Working with communities enhances the situational awareness of 
authority figures,29 and leaving out any single group could cause a gap in coverage. 
Research has also shown that communities must be evaluated on many levels to detect 
patterns—census data has been used to show that some community characteristics can 
predict neighborhoods’ vulnerability to disasters.30  Community policing has been helpful 
in conducting such analysis, and through trial-and-error has developed efficiencies for 
doing so. For instance, efforts in some areas have shown that it is more efficient to work 
with existing community organizations than to create new ones.31   
4. The Role of Government 
Even when the boundaries (or types) of the community are understood, there are 
several competing definitions and viewpoints about what the role of government 
(especially federal) should be in this process. The British government has an extensive 
strategy for engagement, where it encourages ongoing relationships with the community, 
and provides clear expectations of the actions it is willing to take to promote 
engagement.32  In Australian literature there is a focus on directing engagement to 
interest groups centered on religion, business, professional associations, and academia.33   
                                                 
29 Samantha L. Magsino, Rapporteur, Application of Social Network Analysis for Building Community 
Disaster Resilience: Workshop Summary, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009), accessed 
July 16, 2011, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12706.  
30 Betty Hearn Morrow, “Community Resilience: A Social Justice Perspective/Community and 
Regional Resilience Initiative Research Report 4,” Community and Regional Resilience Initiative (2008).  
31 Cabinet Office, Preparing for Emergencies. 
32 Ibid. 




Fishman and Lebovich34 argue that governments should reduce their role in 
community outreach for counterterrorism purposes. They describe what they see as 
shortcomings of some programs, such as the Los Angeles Police Department’s strategy 
(at one point deemed “Muslim Mapping” by the media35) and Britain’s CONTEST 
Strategy (especially the Prevent section), as cases where they believe government 
intervention hurt relationships with at-risk communities more than it strengthened them. 
The Fishman and Lebovich evaluation does bring up a valid point, that outreach should 
not be done solely in the context of counterterrorism, but in a wider context to address 
grievances.36  While the literature reviewed for this paper does not support their 
recommendation to reduce the government’s role in engagement, a federal framework for 
engagement could at least partially address their point by addressing quality of life issues 
beyond those that overtly contribute to radicalization.   
In the U.S., the federal government has not yet taken a role in large-scale 
community engagement. While campaigns like Ready.gov have served as useful 
advertising tools, they have remained one-way paths of communication. Their message 
often goes unheard, as it is not geared toward the needs of daily life, needs that go 
unsupported by many government organizations.37  To date, local governments have been 
able to establish one crucial aspect of a relationship that the federal government has not 
been able to engender—trust. In many ways, local governments are much better suited to 
develop trust with their communities, if for no other reason than direct interaction. Bach 
and Kauffman noted that the approval rating for federal employees increases sharply 
when they interact with residents during their workday.38  Local officials, then, with 
more interaction, are likely more predisposed to positive relationships with residents. 
                                                 
34 Fishman and Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization.” 
35 Richard Winton, Teresa Watanabe, and Greg Krikorian, “LAPD Defends Muslim Mapping Effort,” 
Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2007, accessed April 21, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-
me-lapd10nov10,0,3960843.story.  
36 Fishman and Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization,” 20. 
37 Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.” 




This is also more of a necessity for local civil servants like the police, who have needed 
to maintain civil relationships for longer periods of time.39   
In 2011, the Obama Administration released companion strategy documents 
specifically directed at violence (particularly terrorism) prevention measures:  
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (ELP) and 
The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States (SIP). These documents made several broad policy 
statements, as well as some relatively detailed recommendations for outreach strategies. 
Among the more fundamental tenants of the documents is the notion federal officials are 
often “ill-suited” to intervene at a community level. ELP attributes this to the speed of 
local representatives to identify problems and customize appropriate responses.40  ELP 
goes on to note that local partners should be sought for strategies and ideas.  
SIP contains more tangible strategies than the philosophically-driven ELP. It 
places the primary responsibility for outreach on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and 
recommends establishing other outreach offices in departments such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. The roles of the federal government in engagement, according 
SIP, are to act as a facilitator/convener of engagement discussions, and to support local 
initiatives (including community policing) with information and grants.41  While these 
documents provide some guidance, they have been criticized as lacking specific details,42 
as well as being “very aspirational.”43   
                                                 
39 Nicole J. Henderson, Christopher W. Ortiz, Naomi F. Sugie, and Joel Miller. Law Enforcement & 
Arab American Community Relations after September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty. 
New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2006, accessed July 16, 2011, 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=147/Arab%2BAmerican%2Bcommunity%2Brelations.pdf.  
40 Office of the President, Empowering Local Partners, 3. 
41 Ibid. 
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However, the U.S. has several federal agencies already conducting outreach in a 
manner that seems to attempt to actualize the Obama Administration’s guidance. Much of 
this outreach has come from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). This remainder of this section will focus on a review of 
existing federal outreach offices and programs in DHS and DOJ that are designed to 
prevent violent behaviors, both from a traditional crime-based approach as well as 
measures to counter violent extremism (CVE). 
5. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)—DHS seems to have 
developed its engagement program specifically in response to complaints regarding their 
handling of security issues. DHS has classified a significant portion of engagement 
activities within the broader context of preserving civil liberties. While the office handles 
complaints from a range of areas, including abuse of law enforcement powers,44 their 
outreach is far more targeted—they aim to reach “American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, 
Middle Eastern, and Sikh communities”45 in the U.S. In FY2010, outreach was expanded 
to some Latino and Asian American Communities.46  The office has “special” outreach 
efforts based on issues, as well as an Incident Communication Coordination Team 
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dialogue immediately after a terrorist event.47 CRCL’s outreach is geographically limited 
to “regular” meetings in thirteen U.S. cities,48 a list that excludes seven of the ten largest 
U.S. cities by population.49   
Assessment of CRCL is difficult, as little has been published on the office’s 
engagement beyond strategy documents and lists of outputs (e.g., number of roundtables 
held50). Not much has been written from the perspective of those engaged, nor has there 
been much praise for the system’s efforts. It is possible that the wide dispersion of 
resources has failed to develop a deep level of trust with their focus audience, and it is not 
clear how information from roundtables and other events is being used in DHS. It appears 
that the program has been accepted by communities, though that is only discernible 
through a lack of objection, which could also be the result of little awareness of the 
system.    
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—FEMA has a more 
strategy and culture-oriented approach to engagement than CRCL, as Administrator 
William Craig Fugate has developed his “Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management”51 (Whole Community). In Whole Community, Fugate seeks to build 
resilience52 by bringing “residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational 
and community leaders, and government officials” together so that each may better 
understand the others’ needs. Fugate believes that a greater understanding of the 
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perspectives of multiple stakeholders will ultimately lead to a more efficient use of 
resources and support network in times of crisis.53     
Whole Community outlines a strategy that seems poised to build trust with 
communities. It encourages members of many parts of society (including government) to 
improve their communications and learn about each other’s capabilities. This type of 
local, open discussion is in line with Bach and Kauffman’s theories on developing trust.54  
Fugate also encourages the government to use the information to determine resource 
allocation, clear evidence that the strategy promotes bi-directional communication, rather 
than the more common centralized, top-down approach55 that forces stakeholders to react 
to the government’s actions.  
The most difficult aspect of Whole Community may be implementation. While 
emergency managers in many municipalities already have relationships with partners 
from many aspects of society (as evidenced by the “Strategic Themes in Practice” 
section56), it is unclear from the document if or how the federal government will also 
maintain these relationships, or if that will be left to the locals.   
6. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Civil Rights Division—Much like DHS, DOJ has a portion of its outreach housed 
in a unit that more generally oversees civil rights prosecutions. Although the outreach is 
focused on a similar group (offenses against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and 
South-Asian descent57), the DOJ mission is slightly different, as it specifically aims to 
respond to “backlash” incidents against those communities.58  This office appears to be 
focused on prosecutions, and research does not indicate that they take larger measures to 
engage residents.     
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Community Relations Service—The Community Relations Service shares its 
target audience with the Civil Rights Division, but plays a much different role. The 
Community Relations Service operates in a fashion similar to CRCL, as it brings DOJ 
personnel to communities for outreach sessions and conflict resolution around backlash 
issues.59  Because their outreach is based on backlash issues, the Community Relations 
Service takes a reactive approach. While they do attempt to establish trust with their 
audience, they do so after an event has already occurred, and may incur suspicion due to 
their post-event timing. It is unclear as to how the information from these meetings is 
used, however some of it may be taken for training purposes. Unlike CRCL, the 
Community Relations Service conducts awareness and cultural competency training for 
law enforcement officials, with a particular slant on preventing civil rights violations. 
While the DOJ has implemented this team, it is unclear whether it could be used in a 
proactive nature, or to provide trainings beyond a law enforcement scope.       
Offices of the U.S. Attorneys (USAO)—The SIP places a great deal of 
responsibility for engagement on the USAO, noting that “United States Attorneys, in 
consultation with local and Federal partners, are best positioned to make local 
determinations about which communities they should engage.”60  By being “best 
positioned,” the authors of SIP seem to be referring to the USAO’s organization by 
geographic boundaries—there are 93 district offices throughout the U.S., Puerto Rico, 
and Guam.61  They are referred to frequently throughout the SIP, and are cited as the lead 
agency in several engagement tactics. When referring strictly to countering violent 
extremism, the USAO has an outreach audience that sounds familiar: “Muslim, Sikh, and 
Arab American communities.”62  USAO has also similarly set up dialogues with these 
focus groups surrounding “specific situations and trends.”63   
                                                 
59 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism, 57.  
60 Office of the President, Strategic Implementation Plan, 8. 
61 “List of Current US Attorneys’ Offices,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, accessed March 12, 
2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Attorney#List_of_current_U.S._Attorneys.27_offices.  





When discussing the USAO focus on the broader picture of violence prevention, 
however, a much more robust framework for engagement comes to light. Since 1991, 
USAO has participated in Weed and Seed, Project Safe Neighborhoods, the Attorney 
General’s Anti-Gang Strategy,64 and other efforts that focused around outreach and 
intervention to local communities. Attorney General Eric Holder has placed a renewed 
focus on prevention, noting that citizens need both prosecution for crimes committed, as 
well as support for networks that help communities reduce destructive behaviors.65  The 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania alone has worked on the following violence prevention 
initiatives, in addition to several others: 
• Don’t Fall Down in the Hood—The program was aimed at youth 
offenders who have been arrested for illegal guns, narcotics, or assaults, it 
aims to empower participants by teaching them how to use available 
resources to take control of their lives.  
• Voice of Youth—The Eastern District USAO worked with a local arts 
organization and students in Philadelphia to begin a dialogue about how 
violence has affected their life, and then created a video together as an 
expression of their conversation. The video was then shown at a film 
festival, and used in addressing other youth groups. The program then 
expanded to bring in local athletes to participate in the conversations. 
• Juvenile Justice/Criminal Justice Curriculum—A collaboration between 
the Philadelphia District Attorney and the Eastern District produced 
lessons for students in the Philadelphia School District to improve their 
understanding of the justice systems. 
• Youth Court—The Eastern District worked with local schools to develop 
courts where students served as judges, jurors, bailiffs, jury foremen, and 
clerks. The exercise was designed to instruct students on the perspectives 
and responsibilities of those in the criminal justice process. The exercise 
was also intended to use peer pressure to promote positive decisions, and 
allow students to express their sentiments from different perspectives.66   
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These programs have demonstrated that the USAO is capable of effective 
community outreach: Their programs develop trust by developing relationships with 
citizens, particularly the youth; utilize information from sessions to shape future outreach 
efforts, as well as produce tangible products with the community; and over several years 
have shown to be a well-received approach, though limited by funding constraints. Even 
with funding limits, programs that empower individuals can have long-term results, as 
these strategies are designed to avoid reliance on a single guide or program.    
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—The FBI is mentioned as a participant 
in almost every federal CVE engagement document. However, very little information is 
available about outreach efforts being led by the FBI. Testimonies and literature exist that 
refer to an “extensive program”67 to speak with, again “Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South 
Asian communities in the United States,”68 but provide little detail. Most documented 
outreach activities are coordinated at the local field offices.69  The principal exception to 
this is the Specialized Community Outreach Team, which worked with several Somali 
communities in the U.S. regarding a threat surrounding the 2009 presidential 
inauguration.70 
While SIP primarily continues to see the FBI in a participant role in engagement 
the strategy also calls for the development of an FBI CVE Coordination Office, which 
will focus on developing CVE educational materials. The FBI’s engagement strategies 
appear to have the potential to build trust and develop two-way communications, but the 
perception of the FBI by their target audience may inhibit that from happening. The FBI 
may be more successful in serving as a partner or participant, rather than a leader in 
community engagement, at least until fears of domestic surveillance or targeted 
enforcement can be abated.       
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Building Communities of Trust (BCOT)—BCOT was an initiative in the DOJ 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Its purpose was to determine ways to 
encourage residents to share information with law enforcement and fusion center 
representatives. The BCOT team held meetings in four locations across the country with 
a diverse group of stakeholders.71  The meetings were specifically focused on identifying 
ways in which the relationship between law enforcement and the community could be 
improved, with the ultimate goal of the community making recommendations for changes 
to government operations that would make them more willing to share public safety 
information.  
The findings of BCOT were published in July 2010 as a series of 
recommendations for fusion center operators and local law enforcement officers involved 
in community policing.72 The recommendations were generally grouped into two 
categories: internal agency actions that would improve community relationships and 
overall transparency; and a guide to replicate the BCOT process. While many of the 
recommendations for the internal reforms are useful tools, the method for engagement 
may not be effective at ultimately cultivating trust. By singling out minorities and 
immigrants (who may be predisposed to not trusting government73) for participation, 
these groups may feel targeted. This is particularly true in the context of a discussion 
focused on sharing public safety information, which may be perceived as “snitching.”  
The BCOT process seems to lack tangible examples for community members about how 
they benefit by providing information. This lack of buy-in may ultimately weaken the 
effectiveness of the program. 
7. Coordination of Federal Engagement 
To date, the only entity coordinating CVE outreach is “a National Task Force, led 
by DOJ and DHS, was established in November 2010 to help coordinate community 
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engagement at the national level.”74  Without one entity holding power, however, there is 
a strong chance that coordination will be difficult, as DOJ and DHS operated 
independently of each other. Leadership may be more effective if it is determined by the 
White House, by designating a single agency to serve as the principal hub for collecting, 
disseminating, and evaluating information on counter-radicalization. The main function 
of this leadership agency would be to collect, analyze, and share best practices with a 
wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors, including community leaders 
and non-profits. This agency could determine the best use of resources, and identify the 
most appropriate agencies to conduct outreach with different communities. 
8. What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet 
Regardless of the tactics used for engagement, Bach et al.’s notion of building 
social trust75 is an essential characteristic of successful engagement programs. Bach et al. 
write that government officials and the public do not trust each other. They believe that 
officials are out of touch, partly due to the schism created between the two groups in the 
creation of the U.S. homeland security enterprise.76  This schism has led to the formation 
of an engagement paradox:  the government’s opaque handling of threats has led the 
public to become more reliant on the government for protection; as resources dwindle 
and threats increase in number, the government then asks the public to be prepared to 
defend itself; in the end, both sides see the other as unresponsive to their demands.77   
This paradox is further supported by literature that describes how a centralized 
federal structure is not effective at engaging communities. The vast majority of 
community engagement at the federal level involves centralized, top-down approaches.78  
This style of engagement has shown significant shortcomings, as it restricts the 
community’s input and responsibility. Bach et al. note that the U.S. government’s 
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structure for preparedness has traditionally been concentrated within the institutions of 
government and the disasters of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina demonstrated shortcomings 
in the ability of this approach to coordinate “across multiple agencies, sharing information, 
and having sufficient flexibility to meet asymmetric threats.” 79 Instead of being engaged in 
an open, proactive strategy, the community is forced to react to the government’s actions.  
Emergency plans, Ready.gov, and the Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FCBI) all 
fit this profile. Then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Chertoff 
confirmed this when he described the programs in 2007, as he applauded Ready.gov as an 
“advertising campaign.” Chertoff also described the FBCI’s ability to centralize groups 
whose very strength was their dispersion in communities.80   The federal government has 
gone so far as to dilute effective community organizations by offering them funding, and 
then subjecting them to the bureaucracy required to distribute federal services.81  The 
top-down approach of centralized entities reinforces the patron-client relationship that has 
alienated many citizens from engaging in their government.82   
Top-down thinking, however, is not universally discarded as negative. After 
expounding on the benefits of community engagement for improving relations, 
information sharing, giving individuals an influence on decision making, and other 
benefits, Athol Yates writes that the top-down approach for engagement is actually 
necessary. He believes that national security does not allow it any other way.83 Yates’ 
fatalistic description does not give any further argument; he simply accepts it as a truth 
and moves on with his description.  
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9. Procedural Justice 
The work of Dr. Fathali Moghaddam takes a similar approach to Bach et al. in his 
treatment of the importance of the relationship between government and the citizenry, but 
he does so with a perspective more focused on preventing terrorism. Moghaddam has 
developed a “staircase” metaphor to describe the progression of the mentality of 
individuals who eventually take actions that may qualify them as “terrorists.”84  The 
“ground floor” of this staircase, or the beginning of the path of terrorism, revolves around 
an individual’s sense of fairness. This fairness can be multifaceted, from distribution of 
material wealth to the individual’s sense of “place” in society.85  Among the different 
aspects of life that can be viewed with fairness, research supports the idea that procedural 
justice (defined by Moghaddam as “the process through which decisions are made”) is of 
primary importance.86     
Procedural justice can include many aspects of interactions between citizens and 
authority figures, including “how people feel they have been treated, whether they think 
they have been listened to, and whether their viewpoints have been given respect and 
consideration.”87 Research has shown that when citizens view their government 
representatives as legitimate, those citizens are more likely to comply with the law, and 
reduces the cost associated with the judicial process.88 
Procedural justice research has determined that different contexts require different 
qualities of engagement. Tyler and Blader89 note that one of the primary distinctions that 
must be made in procedural justice is between the different reasons citizens cooperate 
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with authorities. Their research shows that individuals are more likely to participate when 
the individuals experience “procedural fairness,” particularly when participation is not 
mandatory. These researchers find that the actual process of implementing decisions 
made by the group is done in an inclusive and thus “fair” manner. This indicates that both 
the rules themselves, as well as how they are implemented, can have an effect on the 
citizens’ perception of authority figures.90   
The research of Kristina Murphy further supports the argument, and shows that 
procedural justice has an impact on citizens’ impression of the legitimacy of the police, 
satisfaction with overall policing, and willingness to cooperate with police.91  Murphy 
also notes that the source of initiation of contact with police can change how interactions 
are viewed. Her research notes that procedural justice is most important to citizens when 
the police initiate the contact, while the performance of police duties is most important to 
citizens when the contact is initiated by citizens.92  This is an important differentiating 
lesson for citizen engagement programs that are driven, and thus initiated by, government 
officials.  
Angelina Davis-Lipman, et al.93 found that even more subtle characteristics can 
play a part in citizens’ determination of the importance of procedural justice in their 
interactions with authority figures. Their research focused on individuals’ willingness to 
receive help from authority figures. Subjects were most likely to accept help when they 
“received neutral, trustworthy, and respectful treatment.”94 Subjects were less concerned, 
however, about the degree to which the distribution of outcomes was advantageous to 
their standing. This demonstrates that the fairness of the process was more important to 
                                                 
90 Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader, “The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social 
Identity, and Cooperative Behavior,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7 (2003): 355. 
91 Kristina Murphy, “Public Satisfaction with Police: The Importance of Procedural Justice and Police 
Performance in Police-Citizen Encounters,” The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 42 
(2009): 159. 
92 Ibid, 172. 
93 Angela Davis-Lipman, Tom R. Tyler, and Susan M. Andersen, “Building Community One 
Relationship at a Time: Consequences for the Seeking and Acceptance of Help,” Social Justice Research, 
20 (2007): 181-206, accessed July 5, 2012, doi: 10.1007/s11211-007-0038-8.  




participants than the actual outcome. This effect was even more pronounced in the study 
when the authority figure could be considered part of the subject’s “group.”95  These 
results can be seen consistently across white, black, and Hispanic groups, with one 
caveat—minorities are more likely to have the impression that they have been or are 
currently not being treated fairly, and therefore are less willing to cooperate with 
authorities, particularly those who are not minorities.96       
Community policing provides a model that produces a high number of 
interactions between officials and citizens. Lessons taken from these interactions are 
valuable when designing and implementing engagement programs. Among the primary 
lessons learned with community policing is the need to customize strategies to specific 
situations, as described earlier regarding the research of Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt.97   
Other research studies place great importance on interactions with citizens and 
groups in the anomic communities. Gonzalez and Tyler’s work98 highlights the need to 
foster a “sense of social inclusion,” particularly among citizens who they describe as 
feeling marginalized. According to Gonzalez and Tyler, this can be accomplished by 
giving citizens a voice—making sure that the citizens’ perspective is being heard and 
understood during decision-making processes. Their research shows that this is seen as 
important and effective, regardless of whether or not the citizen input influenced 
decisions, or if the decision were already made. The important point was that the 
residents had a chance to express their perspective. This does not necessarily hold true, 
however, for those who perceive themselves to be more integrated with society. 99 The  
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Gonzalez and Tyler study in particular makes a strong case for conducting engagement 
programs in anomic neighborhoods, as they can provide an opportunity for residents to 
present their perspectives.  
Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq have conducted several studies and written several 
articles regarding the use of procedural justice in counterterrorism policy and operations. 
In a 2009 study of Muslim Americans living in the five boroughs of New York City, the 
researchers found that procedural justice was central to the participants’ opinions of both 
counterterrorism policy and implementation.100  Their conclusion was reinforced by the 
surprising number of factors that had little to no effect on the subjects’ willingness to 
cooperate. These factors include:  the degree to which terrorism was seen as a serious 
problem; if the police made participants feel safer; perceptions of the police’s 
effectiveness in combatting terrorism; police presence (including searches, surveillance, 
and harassment); Islamic identity; and opposition to American policies, especially 
internationally.101  This finding has been replicated outside of the counterterrorism realm 
as well. Murphy102 found that while several factors influence satisfaction levels with 
police services (including demographics and neighborhood context), these factors 
dramatically diminished in importance when opinions regarding procedural justice and 
police performance were introduced.    
However, social discrimination based on religion or ethnicity was again (see 
earlier discussion of the perception of treatment of minorities) noted as negatively 
impacting cooperation.103  As was the case with anomic communities, Muslims dealing 
with governments who are conducting large-scale counterterrorism operations are more 
interested in experiencing a fair process than receiving a beneficial outcome from the 
strategy.  
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This same research team of Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq conducted a survey of 
Muslims living in the greater London area in 2010.104  Many of the findings of that study 
supported the results of the 2009 U.S. study, but with a few new, nuanced exceptions. 
The primary finding of the 2009 survey regarding procedural justice as the most 
important influence on Muslim cooperation was reinforced. The finding continued to 
hold true with the elimination of other factors, particularly opinions regarding terrorism 
as an instrument of change. The study produced a particularly diverse group of opinions 
on terrorism, but still no correlation to the participants’ willingness to cooperate.105  This 
is a particularly strong endorsement for procedural justice as a key component to the 
Muslim perception of authority figures in a counterterrorism context. The study also 
noted that while perceptions of procedural justice could predict the degree to which UK 
police forces were seen as legitimate, legitimacy of the police did not independently 
impact cooperation.106     
In a 2011 article, 107 the research team extrapolated several of their findings and 
reinforced the pre-existing notion that terrorism is a policing concern, and that local 
police are in the best position to develop the hyper-local relationships that are necessary 
to build trust and defeat terrorist recruitment. This also assumes the perspective that 
terrorism, much like insurgency, can be defeated by gaining the loyalty of the population 
where the terrorists may be found.108  The researchers also highlight that cooperation 
may be more difficult in counterterrorism situations, as the information given to the 
authorities could result in more severe punishment for offenders than regular policing, 
particularly to someone of their own ethnic group.109  This delicate balance again 
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reinforces the importance of properly conducting strategic outreach, where members of 
the community are able to have input, coupled with counterterrorism tactics that are 
conducted in a fair and equitable manner. The study reveals that when this is done 
properly, the subjects’ willingness to work with police rose 11 percent.110  More 
strikingly, the willingness of subjects to report “suspicious activity” increased by 61 
percent.111  These levels of increased support show a potentially tremendously valuable 
return on investment for equitable, participatory counterterrorism operations. These 
lessons about the Muslim community can be used to support engagement strategies and 
make them more effective for understanding and working with underserved communities.  
Gonzalez and Tyler describe the United States as experiencing a “potentially 
developing crisis in the relationship between citizens and the government.”112  The 
researchers cite studies of gradually declining trust of the U.S. federal government due to 
the use of “unfair procedures and exhibiting untrustworthy behavior” since the Vietnam-
era.113  Gonzalez and Tyler also make reference to the lack of transparent governmental 
procedures, which Bach et al. write is because authority figures are out of touch, partly 
due to the schism created between government officials and the public in the creation of 
the U.S. homeland security enterprise, the paradox described earlier.114  Gonzalez and 
Tyler note that this is particularly troublesome, as authorities rely on communities, 
particularly those that are susceptible to these communication issues, to help identify 
threats to the U.S.115     
However, procedural justice research demonstrates that there are actions within 
the control of U.S. authority figures that can be used to improve the relationship between 
the federal government and anomic (or in counterterrorism cases, Muslim) communities. 
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As the work of Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq showed in counterterrorism operations, 
procedural justice far outweighed the impact of other mitigating factors in citizen 
interactions with authority figures. The three also believe that affording Muslim 
Americans a voice in formulating counterterrorism policy can have a great increase on 
the sense of procedural justice.116 The research of Murphy (described earlier) 
demonstrated that procedural justice and police performance (both of which are 
controlled by the government) are most impactful on satisfaction surveys.117   
Colquitt and Rodell118 note that some simple attitudinal changes could help to 
improve the trust in interactions with authorities—they found that “Being concerned 
about the welfare of employees, sticking to one's word, and using sound values and 
principles to guide actions” all work towards increasing trust in professional 
relationships. The work of Barry and Tyler119 also note that members who perceive a 
group to have procedural justice issues may be more inclined to participate in that 
group’s events to correct the situation. This optimistic finding could be helpful in 
supporting the idea that those in anomic and Muslim communities may be willing to 
participate in the remediation of U.S. policies if invited.  
10. What We Need to Know 
Homeland security strategists and practitioners need to know how the federal 
government can adopt lessons from community engagement strategies to improve its own 
outreach, and ultimately its relationship with American residents, especially those in 
underserved communities. The U.S. federal system, in particular DHS, is military-style 
bureaucracy that operates from a central command and control system, 120 and is not 
designed to connect with communities in a decentralized way. To incorporate the Nolan 
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methodology, the federal government may need to develop a very “local” initiative that 
can respond to the complexities of America’s communities. The Cities of Philadelphia 
and Chicago121 provide models of local engagement that serve similar purposes, but are 
not connected to the federal system. These, and other examples, are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter III.      
As a corollary, the literature review also failed to define any strategy for 
communities that do not have a strong system of local organizations. Each of the 
documents reviewed, with the exception of the Nolan article122 and Home Office Online 
Report,123 either described communities that successfully self-organized, or touted the 
benefits of engagement based on the assumption that communities had strong local 
groups. The closest information came from the procedural justice research, which 
generally encouraged a culture of inclusiveness. To develop a strategy that secures the 
goals of the homeland security enterprise, this will need to be addressed, as those 
“forgotten” communities may be the most attractive destinations for those who may 
become threats.     
While the “forgotten” communities may seem to have the most dire plight, 
government officials must recognize that there is a certain degree of resiliency embedded 
in any community, regardless of how engaged it is or is not. Each community has its 
strengths, and respected citizens are raised in even the most troubled neighborhoods.124  
Engagement can help officials understand these communities more thoroughly, and use 
that knowledge to improve their performance.  
The federal government recognizes the importance of this effort. In a guide for 
Project Safe Neighborhoods, engagement and resilience were shown to help improve  
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crime reporting, developed new investigative and prosecution strategies, prevented 
misunderstandings about law enforcement programs, and strengthened gun crime 
prevention efforts.125     
The challenge is to figure out how to take what is known about local engagement 
and tie it into a federal framework. 
D. METHOD  
1. Methodology  
The methods include a literature review, case study, and policy analysis. The 
literature review was used to gain an understanding of the theory behind the problem 
space and define desirable qualities for a framework to effectively address these issues, 
and identify gaps that require the creation of a new framework. It was also used to 
identify criteria to evaluate existing engagement programs. The case studies reviewed 
existing engagement programs (domestic and international) to evaluate their 
effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses. The policy analysis was used to develop a 
framework for engagement that may be applied on a large scale, and fulfill the criteria 
established from the literature review and analytical framework.  
2. Data Sample 
The existing engagement programs selected for the case study are operated by the 
governments of Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Great Britain. Aspects of each 
of these programs were mentioned in the literature review for this thesis, as each has 
strengths that may be considered smart practices: Chicago has seen success building on 
its city-wide community policing model to empower citizens; Philadelphia has built trust 
with residents in more focused areas of high crime and low quality of life; Los Angeles 
has conducted specific Muslim outreach to improve its’ homeland security standing; and 
the United Kingdom provides a model of a national engagement strategy based on 
homeland security. These programs have also experienced setbacks that can be analyzed 
                                                 




to identify weaknesses to consider when developing recommendations for a federal 
framework for engagement. The definition of community caused several perception 
issues in Los Angeles, and will serve as the most significant setback evaluated among the 
cases.    
Please note that the author is the Director of the PhillyRising Collaborative. This 
allowed the author to leverage first-hand knowledge and experience of engagement 
operations in an urban setting. This may have also introduced some bias in favor of local 
engagement programs. To combat this bias, the author developed a consistent framework 
(as seen in Chapter II) to apply to each case studied in this thesis. The author also sought 
competing viewpoints when conducting the literature review.  
Chapter II, Analytical Framework, outlines in the background of the specific 
aspects of each case that were evaluated:  how each agency defined the community to be 
engaged, what tactics were used for engagement, what cost/resources were needed for 
implementation, and how each strategy was evaluated by their audience for success.     
To determine a suitable structure for engagement at the federal level, existing 
federal outreach programs were evaluated in the literature review. The analysis from the 
literature review was later compared with the notion of the Regional Outreach and 
Operations Coordination Center (ROOCC), as proposed by Brad Deardorff in his thesis 
Countering Violent Extremism: the Challenge and the Opportunity.126 Deardorff 
envisions ROOCC as centers that house a wide variety of specialists and coordinate 
outreach missions within the U.S., in a manner that aims to improve communications 
with the Muslim community in America. The ROOCC concept was evaluated for its 
feasibility as a portion of the federal engagement structure outlined in this thesis, and as a 
model for countering anti-American messages propagated by terrorists.        
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3. Data Collection 
Data was collected for this thesis primarily through published materials. It 
involved examination of primary sources produced by the agencies that were used as case 
studies, as well as reviews conducted of the programs from various independent sources 
and newspaper articles when available. It also involved a literary review that examined 
theoretical issues underlying the research question and problem space. Research focused 
on existing academic studies that are relevant to the underlying assumptions of this thesis, 
specifically related to the research question and the subquestions.  
4. Data Analysis 
Analysis for this thesis was taken from an appreciative inquiry perspective – the 
review of the case studies identified smart practices, policies and tactics that provided for 
successful engagement, with a particular emphasis on building trust. The findings were 
used to develop recommendations for the development of a federal system for engaging 
communities throughout the U.S. Appreciative inquiry has been chosen as a lens for 
analysis because the nature of the problem space required a creative solution. As 
mentioned in the literature review, there is no current national U.S. engagement 
framework. By taking an appreciative approach, this thesis analyzed existing engagement 
strategies, and built on their strengths to create a system that incorporates lessons learned 
from domestic and international governments.      
The ultimate goal of this thesis was to take successful existing engagement 
methods and develop the beginning of a framework that can be applied at multiple levels 
of government across the U.S. The framework, identified as “the Rising System,” 
incorporates the federal, state, and county/local/tribal (as appropriate) entities that serve 
communities selected for focused engagement. The Rising System is designed to provide 
a recommendation for how the U.S. public safety and homeland security communities 




E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The first chapter of this thesis contains the structure of how the research was 
conducted, as well as a literature that reviewed the academic support for the benefits of 
engagement and perspectives on the qualities of how engagement may be conducted. 
Chapter II provides an analytical framework for evaluating engagement programs. It 
specifically develops three criteria that are the basis for evaluation: The focus each 
program places on violence prevention, the method by which each program defines 
“community,” and the degree to which each program demonstrates its ability to 
effectively build trust with the community. Chapter III conducts a comparative analysis 
of engagement programs in Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Great Britain. Each 
case is evaluated for positive qualities that may be applied to a U.S. federal engagement 
system, as well as pitfalls to avoid. Chapter IV outlines the Rising System, the 
engagement strategy proposed based on the findings of the research conducted for this 
thesis. Finally, Chapter V specifically addresses the applicability of the research and 
Rising System to the research questions, and describes some other aspects that may be 




II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter presents the framework that will be used to evaluate the case studies 
in Chapter III. The items selected for analysis were themes that emerged from the 
literature review that warranted further examination: Community engagement as a 
violence prevention tool, how communities may be defined, and how certain tactics can 
be used to develop trust between citizens and government. The analysis for each theme 
produced criteria by which the case studies in Chapter III will be evaluated. The criteria 
were then used to specify further subsets of the research question for exploration in the 
case studies, as well as aspects to address in the recommendations. A chart that maps the 
criteria and questions can be found at the end of this chapter.   
A. THE NEED FOR TRUE PREVENTION 
On September 11, 2011, the U.S. marked the tenth anniversary of the War on 
Terror. In the past decade, U.S. counterterrorism, military, and police forces have focused 
on executing tactics to disrupt activities that pose a threat to public safety. Intelligence 
analysts and investigators have spent the majority of their time seeking connections to 
learn about terror plots and stop them before implementation. The lack of another 
successful major terrorist attack in the U.S. seems to indicate that these strategies have 
been effective, but they have a common shortcoming—they are all reactive.127  The U.S. 
lacks a true prevention strategy128—one that seeks to stop individuals from choosing an 
extremist path before they are fully committed. The need for such efforts is explicitly 
recognized in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011).129  Strategies such as 
Empowering Local Partners and the Strategic Implementation Plan, as discussed in 
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Chapter I, have made progress in this area, but are not yet fully-developed, 
comprehensive strategies for federal prevention.      
While development of a comprehensive prevention strategy would have a positive 
impact on the homeland security resources allocated to disruption, its impact may be even 
more significant on another aspect of homeland security that the U.S. has grappled 
with—what to do with convicted terrorists. As the U.S. has become more successful at 
interrupting violent plots, the government finds itself holding prisoners who have 
demonstrated their devout hatred of the United States. Although official estimates of the 
number of convicted or suspected terrorists in U.S. custody are difficult to obtain, a 2009 
fact sheet from the Department of Defense noted that 530 detainees had been transferred 
out of Guantanamo Bay, and that 14 percent of those released were either confirmed or 
suspected of re-engaging in terrorist activities.130  This is a result of what Dr. Andrew 
Silke describes as a “protracted terrorist conflict.”  According to Silke, involvement in 
this type of conflict will lead the U.S. to pursue new counterterrorism options:       
In protracted terrorist conflicts, many states eventually come to recognize 
the value of giving active terrorists a third option. The first option is 
continued involvement in the terrorist group and in terrorist activity. 
Option two is death or incarceration at the hands of the state. The third 
option is effectively a “get out” clause that allows individuals to put their 
involvement in a conflict behind them without having to face the severe 
penalties normally meted out by the state.131 
To determine the best way to handle the “third option,” the U.S. must first focus 
its attention on what the goals of this option would be. If detained extremists are 
reintegrated into American society, how will officials determine when it is safe to do so?  
What level of disassociation from their past will suffice?   
Two basic categories exist to classify the goals of the third option:  
disengagement and deradicalization. A disengaged terrorist is one who has abandoned the 
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use of violence, and may break association with a violent group. 132  A deradicalized 
terrorist is one who has renounced a violent ideology, assumed a moderate ideology, and 
may be willing to participate peacefully in society.133  The distinction between the two is 
critical, as disengagement and deradicalization involve different processes, and studies 
have shown each to have different levels of success.134  With the relatively short life span 
of programs focused on deradicalization (few have existed for more than ten years), more 
long-term research is needed to determine the ultimate success of such programs.135  The 
lack of proven programs to deal with these prisoners enhances the sense of urgency 
needed for preventing radicalization.  
Criteria for Evaluation:  Engaging individuals before they embark on an 
extremist path may be the most effective way to deal with these issues. The case studies 
that follow will be evaluated to the degree to which they provide a proactive strategy to 
prevent conditions that may contribute toward radicalization and/or alienation. Strategies 
with a reactive component will also be credited for ameliorating negative situations, but 
preference will be given to efforts that prevent these conditions. These aspects will be 
captured through questions categorized under “Engagement Tactics” in Figure 2.1, 
Methodology Matrix.          
B. DEFINING THE COMMUNITY 
To engage individuals who may be at risk for radicalization, the government must 
first have a method for defining which communities are the most susceptible to extremist 
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influences. Communities may be defined by a number of characteristics:  neighborhood, 
city, county, region, ethnicity, culture, race, groups with common interests, and even 
geographic areas as small as a block or housing development may have a distinct 
identity.136  A brief literature review demonstrated that several disciplines, particularly 
from the perspective of government agencies, have attempted to codify the characteristics 
that define communities. Two of the most prolific attempts have come from the public 
health and policing fields.  
MacQueen et al. conducted research from a public health perspective to define a 
community. Their survey found four characteristics that were used by more than half of 
their respondents to describe a community: Locus (sense of place), sharing (common 
interest / perspective), action (participating in activities together), and social ties 
(relationships).137 Their research further suggested that “locus” is so critical to 
community identity that as the sense of place dwindled, so did the overall sense of 
community.  
While the MacQueen study found that four characteristics were most important to 
identifying a community, their survey also showed thirteen other relevant characteristics. 
The researchers concluded that there are so many characteristics of communities, that no 
standard approach can be used to reach any one group.138  MacQueen et al. ultimately 
defined community as:  
a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social 
ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in 
geographical locations or settings.139 
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Research from the policing perspective produced similar results. In a publication 
for the Police Executive Research Forum, Daniel Flynn described three general 
characteristics that are found to be the basis of a community: geography, a shared sense 
of character or identity, and common concerns.140  These three considerations contain an 
enormous number of potential combinations to define neighborhoods, and should not be 
oversimplified. However, they are remarkably similar to the characteristics identified by 
the MacQueen study, and the different perspectives appear to validate each other.    
Defining the community from the perspective of policing, particularly community 
policing, requires an emphasis on geography, as American police departments (at least 
patrol divisions) are generally organized with physical boundaries. While police 
departments may attempt to use “natural” boundaries for their divisions, these may not 
always be congruous with communities defined by residents. In these situations, the 
police (and their partners) must work to ignore the artificial limits of their patrol areas, 
and instead focus on the “natural” (ethnic, socioeconomic, religious, etc.) boundaries of 
neighborhoods.141 Proper identification of communities is critical to the success of 
engagement activities (including community policing).142    
While there are clearly many methods for defining communities, there are also 
various levels of organization within communities. The community policing literature 
reviewed for this thesis almost exclusively assumed that a relatively coherent community 
exists to be organized, engaged, or led. However, Alpert and Moore cite several examples 
(such as suburbs that mature quickly and inner city neighborhoods in decline) that may 
not have an existing system of organization.143  While there are success stories of 
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government officials assisting in developing a sense of communal identity,144 such 
development requires a fundamental system for building capacity. These are the 
communities that Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt described as “anomic,” and may be the 
most attractive areas for the development of criminal enterprises.145    
Criteria for Evaluation:  The method for defining communities is thus crucial to 
the success of an engagement strategy. The case studies that follow will be evaluated on 
their method of defining communities. Definitions may include a geographic component, 
recognize common interests or social ties, or use other data. None of these criteria should 
be mutually exclusive. Cases will also be evaluated for how they treat anomic 
neighborhoods, and if they undertake any capacity-development efforts. Cases will also 
be evaluated to determine whether they customize approaches to different communities 
or use a more universal approach. These aspects will be captured through questions 
categorized under “Definition of Community” in Figure 2.1, Methodology Matrix.      
C. TRUST AND ENGAGEMENT 
While choosing communities properly is a critical first step in an outreach 
process, the long-term goal of engagement programs is to build trust between the 
community and government officials. The Literature Review in Chapter I contains 
several references to the criticality of trust, none as prominent as the discussion of Bach 
et al.’s notion of social trust. They concluded that communities need to be an active 
participant in their government to develop trust with its representatives.146  
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has conducted numerous outreach 
activities focused on disease prevention, and in that process have identified several 
variables that have aided their progress. The most prominent of these was their ability to 
create a “safe space” for community discussion. CDC researchers credit their willingness 
to listen to the concerns of residents as the driver for the development of trust with the 
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residents. They observed that as trust developed, they were able to more effectively 
provide services in a way that was acceptable to the local community, as residents helped 
to ensure that solutions were culturally appropriate.147   
Once again, public health literature supports policing research, as community 
policing techniques have been shown to be able to create this kind of “safe space.”  
Though they provide an obviously different research perspective, community policing 
has been acknowledged as a successful tool at building qualities that build intelligence 
collection capabilities.148  That is to say, community policing has helped develop 
environments where community members voluntarily share information (sometimes 
sensitive) about their communities – people intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal calls 
“walk-ins.”149   
Walk-ins provide an important aspect to preventing extremism, as they provide 
local experts with valuable intelligence information, without resorting to domestic 
surveillance methods on the part of government officials. The rights granted in the U.S. 
Constitution (and other legal documents) place limits on the government’s ability to spy 
on Americans without first engaging in due process. As the 9/11 Commission Report 
highlighted, however, there is a need for a greater understanding of domestic threats to 
national security.150  Promoting walk-ins, who voluntarily share information, may 
provide a useful source of information. Promotion may also help mitigate Phillip 
Bobbit’s “antinomies,” a series of six opposing legal regulations in the American system 
that, according to Bobbit, must be balanced to effectively protect the American  
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homeland. Specifically, walk-ins can aid in resolving the conflicts caused by the 
regulations on domestic versus international intelligence gathering.151 To encourage 
walk-ins, trust is again a key factor.           
While many tactics such as the Department of Justice’s Building Communities of 
Trust (discussed in Chapter I) have focused on policing efforts, Alpert and Moore noted 
that the police cannot be solely held responsible for, nor on their own remedy anomic 
neighborhoods. Anomic neighborhoods require an interdisciplinary system, which relies 
on other agencies and residents contributing to a community’s long-term health.152  This 
type of system is congruent with the notion that communities need to take responsibility 
for their own quality of life. Professor John DiIulio takes this further and describes 
citizens as “co-producers of justice.”  He notes that citizens have responsibility to work 
with local officials to actively improve their quality of life.153  Many of his examples, 
including witnesses testifying against local offenders, may be the product of enhanced 
trust and engagement. DiIulio also notes that “promoting secure communities” means 
more than purely lowering crime rates, it also means attending to the perception of safety 
and quality of life issues that can prevent communities from prospering.154  However, 
these are not necessarily mutually exclusive - a study conducted by University of 
Pennsylvania researchers showed that impacting quality of life issues can assist in crime 
reduction. The study specifically showed that “greening” vacant lots reduced gun 
assaults, vandalism, and criminal mischief, and had a positive effect on the health of 
those living near the lots.155   
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This holistic concept is reinforced by statistics from the Bureau of Justice that 
demonstrate that victimization is not necessarily the cause of fear for many citizens.156  
Alpert and Moore see the improvement of perception of safety as a relatively simple task, 
one that can be primarily accomplished by police officers undertaking simple tasks, such 
as leaving their vehicles and walking foot beats.157  This is not to say, however, that 
effective traditional policing is not necessary in community policing. Quite the opposite, 
traditional policing is necessary to maintain credibility of the outreach efforts, and to 
protect the safety of those who participate. Much like the counterinsurgency efforts 
studied by Flood et al. residents are much more likely to get involved in engagement 
activities if they feel safe doing so.158     
It should be noted that engagement activities are not universally seen as an 
effective way for government entities to achieve their goals. A report by Weisner about 
health worker outreach showed that in one particular community, outreach did not 
improve residents’ attendance at local health centers. Weisner also notes that this is not 
necessarily generalizable to other aspects of health outreach, as studies in India have 
produced contradictory results.159  This is one of many examples that reinforce the broad 
range of factors that contribute to the success or failure of engagement activities.  
Criteria for Evaluation:  To establish relationships that ultimately lead to 
communities sharing more public safety information with appropriate authorities, a 
strategy should be developed that incorporates a wider vision of public safety. While the 
Building Communities of Trust model laid out a feasible process for engagement, it made 
the assumption that individuals and organizations would be willing to share safety 
information after a few reforms, once they understood the “big picture” of how sharing 
would benefit them. Instead, the engagement should begin by discussing quality of life 
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issues in the community—issues that underserved communities (including minorities and 
immigrants) may feel comfortable sharing, since it is less likely to be perceived as spying 
or “snitching.” Focusing on geographic communities rather than interest groups may also 
aid in nullifying the perception that any group is being “singled out.”  Each of the case 
studies will be evaluated for their techniques used to build long-term trust with local 
communities. The creation of a “safe space” for discussion and promotion of walk-ins 
will be given the most credit. These aspects will be captured through questions 








































































































































































III. MODELS TO BRIDGE THE THREATS 
In this chapter, four case studies were evaluated based on the questions listed in 
the matrix at the end of Chapter II. The evaluation begins with a brief background 
description of each case, and then an evaluation across the cases of three elements of the 
engagement strategies based on the findings of the research described in the previous 
chapters: 
a) How “community” is defined; 
b) Which tactics were used to engage the community; and 
c) What costs/resources were needed to implement each strategy? 
These factors will be compared across Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy, 
the City of Philadelphia’s PhillyRising Collaborative, and the United Kingdom’s Prevent 
strategy. A fourth case, based on the work of the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, will be used solely in the section on 
defining the term “community.” This is due partially to a lack of published information 
regarding the Los Angeles unit’s engagement tactics, as well as their focus on solely 
using police services.     
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy 
Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) began as a pilot in 1993. CAPS 
began in five of Chicago’s police districts, and later expanded to the city’s twenty 
remaining districts. When expansion was achieved in all police districts, the strategy was 
considered to be operational in all of Chicago’s neighborhoods.160   
The CAPS strategy is based in four “Key Elements:”  
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1. Expand Police Presence on the Beat 
2. Community Involvement 
3. Support from Other Agencies 
4. Proactive Problem Solving161 
The theory behind CAPS stems from the “broken windows” concept articulated 
by James Wilson and George Kelling. Wilson and Kelling theorize that “disorder 
undermines the capacity of a neighborhood to defend itself.”162  To reduce the amount of 
physical disorder (e.g., vandalism, abandoned buildings and lots, malfunctioning street 
lights,163), the Chicago Police worked with city agencies to address quality of life issues 
including code enforcement, drug house and gang enforcement, landlord-tenant conflicts 
(including municipal administrative adjudication), liquor regulation, school safety, 
graffiti, abandoned buildings, trash, abandoned cars, and the general coordination of 
service delivery.164  In addition to problems with the physical aspect of quality of life, 
CAPS has addressed behaviorally-based issues termed “social disorder,” which include 
loitering, public drinking, and disruption in schools.165 
According to a 2004 report, CAPS is well known to Chicago residents, 
particularly among its Caucasian and African-American populations, where more than 
eighty percent of their populations reported familiarity with the program. In 2002, over 
67,000 people attended CAPS beat meetings, the neighborhood-based problem solving 
sessions focused around the Chicago Police Department’s geographic beats within each 
district. Each of the twenty-five districts created district advisory committees to examine 
and solve problems that affected all beats within a district. Despite the strong gross 
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attendance level at beat meetings, participants was not consistently representative of the 
entire city demographic, as a disproportionate attendance came from “more educated 
residents, homeowners, and older, long-term residents.”166     
2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative 
The PhillyRising Collaborative (PhillyRising) is a strategy coordinated through 
the Managing Director’s Office167 of the City of Philadelphia. PhillyRising began as a 
pilot program in February 2010 with the mission of supplementing the Philadelphia 
Police Department’s Police Service Areas (community policing initiative168). The 
strategy focuses on coordinating civilian municipal services in areas that qualified as 
having chronic issues of crime and disorder.  
While the pilot program encompassed only one neighborhood, by April 2012 
PhillyRising had expanded to ten neighborhoods across Philadelphia,169 and had 
demonstrated a significant reduction in Part I Crime (as defined by the Uniform Crime 
Reporting system)170 in the pilot neighborhood. The purpose, according to the 
PhillyRising website, is as follows: 
PhillyRising targets neighborhoods throughout Philadelphia that are 
plagued by chronic crime and quality of life concerns, and establishes 
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PhillyRising Team coordinates the actions of City agencies to help 
neighbors realize their vision for their community through sustainable, 
responsive, and cost-effective solutions.171     
To achieve these goals, PhillyRising focuses on the following principles when 
engaging communities and developing strategies to improve quality of life: 
• Responsive—PhillyRising staff solicit ideas from residents to determine 
most prominent local issues, as well as suggestions to ameliorate these 
issues. The staff and work as partners, rather than as a service provider 
and clients, to develop strategies for improving quality of life and reducing 
crime. This process creates a unique plan for each neighborhood. 
• Capacity Building—The PhillyRising model is rooted in the notion that 
communities contain residents who are capable of improving the areas 
where they live. Neighborhoods selected for PhillyRising occasionally fit 
Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt’s definition of anomic,172 as they contain high 
levels of crime and low levels of effective community organization. 
Despite the existing level of community efficacy, PhillyRising staff work 
to provide education and access to resources that will ultimately be 
coordinated by residents. The model aims to have PhillyRising staff teach 
residents rather than create a dependency.    
• Sustainable—Solutions created through the PhillyRising process are based 
on residents’ ideas and ultimately run by residents.  City service providers 
do not sweep in with overwhelming resources for brief periods of time. 
While the City facilitates the start of solutions, empowered residents are 
supported to maintain programs. The intention of this style of operation is 
to produce long-term results that can be supported from within the 
community.  
3. Los Angeles Police Department 
The Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) Counterterrorism operations were 
built as a series of post-9/11 reforms.173 As of June 2011, the system was composed of 
the following components:  a Joint Regional Intelligence Center; a Suspicious Activity 
Reporting process; Terrorism Liaison Officers; Operation Archangel, a partnership with 
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private industry to protect critical infrastructure; the National Counter Terrorism 
Academy; the Hydra program, which works with disaster officials across the region; and 
the Counterterrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau).174 The community outreach 
component is located within two programs: the Muslim Forum, a space for dialogue 
between leadership in the LAPD and Muslim communities;175 and the Counter-Terrorism 
and Special Operations Bureau, the section within LAPD that is focused on community 
engagement from the counterterrorism perspective.176  Both of these outreach programs 
are rooted in communications with Muslims living in Los Angeles. The overall 
counterterrorism operations for LAPD are highly regarded, and in November 2011 the 
Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau was named “Most Notable Law 
Enforcement Counter Terrorism or Crime Prevention Program” by Government Security 
News.177    
4. The United Kingdom—Prevent 
The case of the United Kingdom will be evaluated in a slightly different light, as 
it is the product of a national government, rather than a local government. Despite the 
cultural differences, the United Kingdom’s experience with counterterrorism can provide 
a useful comparison with practices used in the U.S., particularly from the perspective of 
the impact of national policy.  
In July 2011, the British government released a revision its comprehensive 
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four sections: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. The segment that most closely 
parallels the U.S. ELP/SIP strategies is Prevent, with the goal “to stop people becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism.”178 
The responsibility for the whole of CONTEST falls to the Home Office, leaving 
the Home Secretary ultimately in charge of the plan. There is also clear oversight, with 
the most recent version of Prevent audited by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC.179 This 
centralized system of responsibility, as well as a power check on the lead agency,180 
creates a clear center of power that street-level practitioners can look to for guidance.  
In Prevent’s forward, Home Secretary MP Theresa May clearly states that it is a 
plan for counter-terrorism operations, not for “integration.”181 The British use of 
integration here refers to government policy that creates “the conditions for everyone to 
live and work successfully alongside each other.”182  This is a critical distinction for the 
British, one that was clarified in the 2011 Prevent due to confusion in earlier editions.183  
By making this term clearer, the UK hoped to improve both its internal delineation of 
responsibilities for actions, as well as its relationship with the public. Prevent is clearly 
labeled as a security-driven plan, and the British Government wants the public to 
understand that security (specifically regarding terrorism) is not the driver of other 
strategies, particularly integration.  
To make this point abundantly clear, the British government devised a separate 
(but related) strategy for integration titled Creating the Conditions for Integration (CCI), 
a product of the Department for Communities and Local Government. CCI seeks to 
promote five factors that the British believe lead to integration: 
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1. Common ground—A clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which 
focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences.  
2. Responsibility—A strong sense of our mutual commitments and 
obligations, which brings personal and social responsibility.  
3. Social mobility—People able to realize their potential to get on in life.  
4. Participation and empowerment—People of all backgrounds have the 
opportunities to take part, be heard and take decisions in local and national 
life.  
5. Tackling intolerance and extremism—A robust response to threats, 
whether discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and 
increase tensions.184  
Some of the sensitivities to the confusion between Prevent and the UK’s 
integration strategy came as a result of speaking with stakeholders about the 
implementation of the old Prevent strategy, and concerns about covert domestic 
espionage. The British were careful, however, not to discount the impact that integration 
and Prevent have on each other. Prevent and CCI reference each other, and describe how 
they each work together. Neither plan can encompass the other’s mission, but neither will 
be effective without careful implementation of the other.  
B. DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY  
Chapters I and II reviewed research supporting the notion that the method used to 
define “community” can have a significant impact on the success of the engagement. The 
literature further concluded that different types of communities require different 
strategies to effectively build trust. This section will analyze the effectiveness of the 
programs in relation to their definition of community, their ability to recognize different 
definitions, and their treatment of anomic neighborhoods.      
                                                 




1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy 
CAPS is a geographically-based method of community engagement. The Chicago 
Police Department organizes itself into twenty-five police districts, which are further 
divided into 279 police beats.185  These beats are the simplest definition of “community” 
for CAPS. The majority of the community engagement in the CAPS structure happens 
when residents and officers conduct problem-solving exercise at beat-level meetings. 
District advisory committees, composed of the community beat team facilitators (citizen 
leaders for each beat) and community stakeholders, work together and explore/problem 
solve broader district-level trends. Beat meetings are held monthly, but collaboration has 
expanded beyond the confines of the CAPS structure, as new groups have developed and 
meet independently of the beat work. These groups include “block clubs, neighborhood 
watch groups, marches and rallies.”186  
The CAPS attendance figures cited in the “Background” section indicate that the 
definition for community has been successful in many areas, but lacking with some 
demographics. The evaluation CAPS at Ten found that the strategy was successfully 
reaching Caucasians and African-Americans. This information is supported by a survey, 
as well as anecdotal stories contained throughout the CAPS literature, particularly in an 
earlier evaluation, CAPS at Five. The difficulty, however, seems to be the obstacles to 
CAPS’ success in Latino communities; not only did they not fare as well, but evaluator 
Wesley Skogan noted that conditions in Latino areas actually deteriorated.187  The CAPS 
at Ten survey found a much lower participation rate among Latinos, and several reasons 
were proposed in the report:  Many Latinos in Chicago had poor experiences with police 
in their home nations (often corruption and/or abuse), and this impacted their willingness 
to trust American police; language differences that led to communications issues were a 
concern; and questions about the legal status of many Latinos, whether founded or not, 
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put a strain on the relationship.188  The language barrier appears to have been especially 
significant, as Spanish-speaking Latinos were found to be less likely to call the police 
about their concerns, even though they make up a disproportionately high percentage of 
residents in areas that could be considered anomic.189     
Overall, the Chicago strategy for outreach seems to have had less of an impact on 
improving the relationship with the Latino community than other groups. However, this 
still highlights a difficulty facing Chicago’s engagement process. The ability to tie the 
success (or lack thereof in Latino communities) of CAPS to ethnicity also indicates that 
by using a geographically-based method of defining community, ethic delineations may 
also be incorporated, as certain neighborhoods contain concentrations of particular 
ethnicities.        
2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative 
The PhillyRising strategy defines communities as geographic areas 
(neighborhoods). The selection of these neighborhoods begins with nominations from the 
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). Based on their experiences with community 
involvement in the Police Services Areas (PSA), officers nominate locations that they 
believe have chronic crime and quality of life issues. Nominations are evaluated by the 
PPD for density of Part I Crime, and areas that are determined to have a high 
concentration are sent to PhillyRising staff for consideration. As is the case in Chicago, 
these neighborhoods may also be dominated by a particular ethnic group.    
After location nomination, PhillyRising staff conducts an evaluation of other data 
sources, including: income levels, percentage of residents living below the poverty level, 
number of vacant properties, litter index, 311 calls for service, and health data. When the 
data is compiled, PhillyRising staff and the PPD work together to determine which 
neighborhoods have the confluence of crime and low quality of life indicators that make 
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neighborhoods qualify for PhillyRising. These criteria are roughly based on the model 
depicted by Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt described in Chapter I of this thesis.     
Part of the selection process involves determining the boundaries of the 
neighborhood. In Philadelphia, neighborhoods are not always clearly demarcated, and 
choosing these lines has caused controversy on several occasions. A relatively lax 
treatment of boundary lines has aided in alleviating tensions over inclusion. After 
boundaries are settled and neighborhoods chosen, they are prioritized to determine which 
are of the greatest need.  
The selection process serves a twofold purpose: first, it sets a limit to the size of 
the area (typically .15 square miles or smaller, roughly an area four by five city blocks), 
which is important when allocating limited resources. Secondly, the use of small 
neighborhoods appears to serve as a way of rallying residents around a common sense of 
community. Physical boundaries have also provided central locations, including schools 
and recreational facilities, which residents have rallied around for improvement. Despite 
the occasional minor controversy over the inclusion of a particular street, this strategy has 
successfully brought residents of different races, religions, and income levels together to 
work collaboratively with city government. While this process limits inclusion to a 
degree, it may help ensure outreach to a wide variety of communities, so that few high-
risk areas are excluded, as was recommended in the literature review.   
Focusing on physical space has also seemingly preempted overt concerns about 
domestic espionage. While community members have anecdotally seemed skeptical 
about the level of commitment on behalf of the city, or on the ability to deliver a 
coordinated service approach, reception of the strategy has generally been favorable. 
Some communities that have not been selected have actively petitioned to have their 
neighborhood included in PhillyRising. This desire for inclusion clearly denotes a 
favorable impression by some segments of the population, and indicates strong potential 
for “walk-ins”190 who volunteer public safety information to authorities.         
                                                 




The focus of the PhillyRising selection process is generally to act as a proactive 
model for engagement—it does not wait for a major event, but instead focuses on areas 
that are high-risk for violent criminal behavior. A valid counterargument would be that 
PhillyRising is at least somewhat reactive, in that it selects areas that already have a high 
density of this behavior. It can also be argued that because PhillyRising staff is willing to 
work with ex-offenders, the approach has not prevented these individuals from 
committing crimes. However, the overall goal is to support positive efforts in the 
community, which is designed to attract at least some individuals from choosing a path of 
violence, as well as to support those who are interested in leaving a violent path. The 
process also promotes the notion of procedural justice,191 in that it gives these residents a 
voice in the decision-making process for their neighborhood.   
3. Los Angeles Police Department 
LAPD engagement regarding counterterrorism clearly defines the “community” 
as the Muslim population of Los Angeles. This definition caused concern in 2007 when 
LAPD leadership made an effort to orient their outreach strategy based on the locations 
of Muslim communities in Los Angeles. LAPD undertook an effort to plot the 
communities on a map, with the intention of finding moderate Muslim voices within 
these communities. This notion was similar to some aspects of the Prevent strategy from 
the United Kingdom. 192   
However, the effort was seen as an attempt by the LAPD to conduct illegal 
intelligence collection and surveillance activities on the Muslim population. The story 
received widespread media attention, and the project was dubbed “Muslim Mapping.”193  
The backlash from the story was so severe that the mapping aspect of the program was 
terminated approximately one week after it was announced.194  Outreach to the Muslim 
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community, minus the mapping component, continues today. The quality of outreach, as 
demonstrated through the awards received by LAPD for their counterterrorism unit, were 
of little concern, as the perception of the strategy alienated the Muslim community before 
any exercises began to build trust. Giving the Muslim population a voice in how the 
outreach was advertised, as suggested by research describing how procedural justice can 
improve counterterrorism operations,195 may have stemmed the backlash caused by this 
incident.  
4. The United Kingdom—Prevent 
The focus of the British strategy is consistent and reinforced throughout Prevent. 
Within the general realm of counterterrorism, Prevent repeatedly states that it is mainly 
geared toward dealing with Al Qaeda and its affiliates, with general references to violent 
acts based on Islamic extremism.196  While the strategy briefly mentions issues related to 
terrorism from right-wing groups and those associated with “the struggles” in Northern 
Ireland, the Home Office is careful to note that these sources of terrorism are not the 
target audience for Prevent. However, the document does not rule out that some tactics 
may be applied to each type of group, and that current British counterterrorism strategy 
has been significantly impacted by operations in Northern Ireland. The community for 
Prevent, then, is the British Muslim population.   
Based on the focusing on Islamic extremism, two other prominent themes emerge 
from Prevent—deradicalization and the use of funding. A deradicalized terrorist is one 
who has renounced a violent ideology, assumed a moderate ideology, and may be willing 
to participate peacefully in society.197 The Home Office notes that deradicalization 
programs are largely unproven, a condition that is recognized by other studies as well—
with the relatively short life span of programs focused on deradicalization (few have  
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existed for more than ten years), more long-term research is needed to determine the 
ultimate success of such programs.198  However, Prevent goes on to note that the 
possibility for success is worth the effort.199   
As for the use of funding, the UK notes that several expenditures under previous 
Prevent efforts had been questionable—accusations surrounded the idea that some had 
funded the very types of radical groups that counterterrorism operations are designed to 
intercept.200  The Home Office responds to these accusations by noting that money will 
only be granted to organizations that share basic British values.  
The British strategy, however, also brings recognition that engagement will take 
different forms based on the conditions of each community. The British government is 
generally geared toward localism, and delegates much of the specific work of the 
engagement to coordinators based in municipalities (this idea will be explored further in 
the “Engagement Tactics” section that follows). This demonstrates recognition that the 
British see engagement as being influenced by geographically-based factors, and that 
some degree of customization is necessary for each community, or at least each 
municipality.    
5. Comparative Analysis 
While the cases do not use a universally-accepted means of defining community, 
there are some consistent traits across each entity. The first is the existence of some type 
of geographic influence on the definition of community (though this is weakest in the 
Case of Los Angeles). Each of the systems relies on existing geographic divisions created 
by municipalities. In the cases of the local strategies (Chicago and Philadelphia), social 
and political networks are leveraged to reach what is in many cases an already organized 
community. The local municipalities recognize that the existing structure is an effective 
tool to begin engagement, and that there is no need to impose artificial structures that 
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may not be accepted by residents. The British national strategy essentially recognizes the 
same lesson—that local governments have a better understanding of local dynamics than 
the national government, so resources are pushed down to enhance the local engagement 
program.  
The primary difference between the Chicago/Philadelphia strategies and the 
LAPD/British is their specific focus on Islamic communities. CAPS and PhillyRising 
used systems that were more subtle in their process of engagement—Chicago’s plan 
engages all of its communities, and the Philadelphia system determines the areas based 
on levels of crime.201  The local models seem to have a more objective approach, and can 
rely on data rather than a personal identifier (religion). The objective approach leaves less 
room for accusations of profiling by government entities, as evidenced by the lack of 
outcries of profiling and/or domestic spying in the Chicago/Philadelphia models, while 
Prevent has been attacked by various groups throughout Britain, and LAPD had to 
entirely abandon their mapping component. While it is unlikely that many municipalities 
would be able to undertake engagement efforts in all parts of their jurisdiction, and it is 
unclear that crime or low quality of life are indicators of radicalization (though there is 
more evidence that procedural justice plays a role), a combination of objectivity and 
practicality may produce a balanced approach.  
Further research is needed to identify which factors (if any) make a community 
more susceptible to radicalization. If those factors can be determined and then mapped, a 
practical, objective method for selecting engagement could be established. This may also 
reduce claims of violations of civil liberties, if the criteria are seen as fair. Transparency 
and simplicity in the selection process have aided in the local acceptance of the Chicago 
and Philadelphia efforts. The three examples also demonstrate the need for customizing 
outreach approaches for success beyond initial acceptance. After initial acceptance, each 
program may improve by determining which groups are not being reached, and alter 
engagement strategies to explore a more comprehensive approach.    
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C. ENGAGEMENT TACTICS 
This section evaluates criteria from Chapter II found under the headings “the 
Need for True Prevention” and “Trust and Engagement.” The analysis focuses on the 
degree to which the programs successfully built trust with their communities, what the 
role of the government was in the process, whether the programs focused their efforts on 
preventing violence (versus operating reactively), and the programs’ ability to sustain a 
discussion that included issues beyond direct security concerns.  
1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy 
The implementation of CAPS began with a change to police dispatching policy in 
1993: officers were assigned to their beats (the smallest geographically-based service 
area in the Chicago Police Department) for longer periods of time, a concept called Beat 
Integrity. Ideally, Beat Integrity enabled officers to gain a more thorough understanding 
of the neighborhoods they patrol, as well as the people they serve and protect.202  This 
strategy is in line with Bach and Kaufman’s research on building social trust—the 
Chicago Police were able to improve their level of trust with community members 
through frequent interactions in contexts other than a criminal incident.  
The second element of the CAPS strategy comes in the community involvement. 
Regular meetings (monthly) are held in each beat,203 providing a customized and 
prioritized discussion around each neighborhood. In addition to a customized approach, 
CAPS includes a fundamental recognition that poor and minority communities may have 
a weak “civic infrastructure,” what Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt refer to as collective 
efficacy. The CAPS approach calls for the police in Chicago to take a role in building 
some of this infrastructure, and this has been accomplished with heavy public 
involvement.204 
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The third aspect brings the power of city agencies other than the police to assist 
with local quality of life problems. To accomplish this, the City of Chicago implemented 
“special procedures” to improve work flow and coordination between agencies and the 
police department.205 
Finally, the fourth step, collaborative problem solving, brings the other aspects of 
the strategy together. The Chicago Police Department used a five step model for problem 
solving to facilitate discussions. The five steps are as follows: 
1. Identify and Prioritize 
2. Analyze 
3. Design Strategies 
4. Implement 
5. Evaluate and Acknowledge Success206 
This model intends for the police and residents to jointly identify issues on their 
beat, and then work together through the five step process to propose/develop solutions. 
The coordinated work of other city services is intended to contribute to the strategies 
created through the problem solving process.207 The nature of the five steps of this 
process allows the community, police, and other city agencies to identify problems 
unique to each neighborhood and create solutions that can be implemented and monitored 
for effectiveness. The process also addresses another problem referenced by Skogan in 
his evaluation—crime can cause trust to erode between community members as well as 
with government.208 Problem solving served as a strategy to rebuild trust among all 
participants.   
Bringing CAPS to each neighborhood in Chicago supports a strong argument for 
the strategy to be considered proactive—CAPS does not wait for a specific event or 
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enumerated conditions to trigger outreach. This is consistent with the goals stated in 
CAPS promotional materials as well as evaluations, as the notion of prevention is 
frequently cited. 
The strategy has shown an overall indication that it has improved the trust and 
general relationship between residents and their city government, particularly the police 
department. CAPS at Ten cites several statistics that support this trend, particularly the 
large turnout for meetings over a ten-year period (as described in the Background 
section). The survey described in CAPS at Ten also indicates that while there are still 
racial divisions, the overall perception of the Chicago Police is improving and a large 
portion of Chicagoans have responded positively to the strategy.209  The review also gave 
specific grades to individual aspects of CAPS: “public involvement,” which includes 
participation, as well as the structure and direction of beat and district advisory 
committee meetings, received a “B,” “agency partnerships” and “reorganization,” both 
measures of reforms within and among government entities, each received an “A,” 
finally, the “problem-solving” component received a “C,” as some local problems 
seemed to persist annually.210  While the problem-solving process may be more effective 
if more concrete results are produced, the problems addressed in beat meetings may not 
have simple solutions in an urban environment. Furthermore, the positive rankings of the 
other aspects indicate that the problem-solving process itself is having a positive impact 
on the relationship between the community and government.        
2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative 
The PhillyRising engagement process begins with staff members listening to the 
concerns and goals of the selected community. To acquire this information, the staff 
reaches out to a diverse array of stakeholders including:  city departments and employees, 
elected officials, academic institutions, independent organizations (both non- and for-
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profit), community anchors,211 and local residents. Together, these organizations form a 
“community” that work together in specific neighborhoods. The stakeholders are engaged 
in person, both in standing meetings held by stakeholders, as well as larger collaborations 
held by PhillyRising staff. Meetings hosted by PhillyRising staff often include a “show of 
force” by city agencies, to demonstrate the level of commitment to the selected area.      
The tangible result of the meetings is typically the identification of action items 
that serve as goals for high-priority concerns (both geographic and issue-based) of 
residents. Discussions then focus on determining which agencies can support the 
concerns, and which community members are willing to manage implementation. The 
proposed solutions are compiled into an action plan, which includes specific deadlines 
and assignments of personnel to individual tasks. This document provides both a plan for 
the community, as well as a basis for measuring progress. In a symbolic gesture 
signifying agreement on the first draft of the action plan, a representative from each 
organization signs the plan, committing their resources to proposed solutions. This 
method allows PhillyRising to customize its tactics in each neighborhood, a strategy 
strongly supported by the literature. The process also includes a strong emphasis on 
procedural justice, as residents are included in identifying problems and implementing 
solutions.        
As items have been completed on action plans, PhillyRising staff has seen an 
improvement in the trust they receive from residents. This trust has manifest itself 
through the identification of more complex problems (faith in staff abilities), access to 
information that would not otherwise be shared with “outsiders,” and occasionally 
information of a sensitive criminal nature. In one neighborhood, after several months of 
engagement, PhillyRising staff was told of a dead tree that was used to store narcotics. 
City staff quickly removed the tree, and residents saw a significant reduction in the 
presence of drug dealers in the vicinity. This level of trust was only facilitated after staff 
proved that they were both competent and working in the best interest of the 
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neighborhood. Similar to what was seen in Chicago, this supports Bach et al.’s findings 
that frequent, positive interactions are effective at building trust with residents.  
PhillyRising staff has also worked to create mechanisms to educate residents and 
create a comfortable environment for sharing ideas. One such mechanism, the Citizens’ 
Engagement Academy (CEA) is a series of workshops brought to PhillyRising 
neighborhoods. Participants typically meet once a week for eight weeks in a classroom 
setting. Each week features different presenters, who range from heads of city 
departments to representatives from large nonprofit organizations and federal agencies. 
CEA is not utilized in communities that are new to the PhillyRising process, but instead 
in areas where trust has already developed. Meetings are held in politically neutral 
locations, and participants are selected by PhillyRising staff based on the level of 
commitment they have shown to the neighborhood. Ground rules are set for an academic 
environment, so that both participants and presenters understand that they are there to 
learn from each other. This has been particularly helpful in comforting presenters, as their 
audience is prepared and ready to be informed, rather than irate about recent issues that 
they may perceive as handled poorly. CEA has also created a space where residents are 
comfortable interacting with agencies that may otherwise receive a negative reaction due 
to their law enforcement or prosecutorial disposition (Police, District Attorney, U.S. 
Attorney, etc.).      
The PhillyRising process is also designed to improve government performance. 
Historically, Philadelphia’s departments have focused their measures of success 
internally with little coordination. The PhillyRising model encourages managers to meet 
regularly to identify overlapping problems and develop and deliver collaborative 
solutions to long-term, complex issues. As the departments adapt to serving residents in 
this manner, PhillyRising may create a means for right-sizing government resources and 
departmental structures.  
The model is also designed to shift the determination for departmental success 
from strictly internal measures to actual outcomes seen in focus neighborhoods—




geographic boundaries may cause a fundamental shift in how most departments in city 
government conduct their business. Functionally, this is intended require city agencies to 
work with the community on problem solving and coordinating with other city services to 
deliver public safety. 
3. The United Kingdom—Prevent 
Localization is at the heart of Prevent’s tactics. The UK strategy specifically 
outlines the relationship between the central and local governments, which has a 
significant impact on where tactics for engagement are executed. The British government 
in general operates in an environment that attempts to localize power and effort as much 
as possible.212 Prevent makes it clear that localities are at the center of combatting 
terrorism, particularly due to the specialized knowledge of local employees such as police 
officers. However, Prevent also recognizes that the “central departments” must maintain 
a degree of coordination around these efforts, as they pertain to national security.213   
The British engagement structure is also dictated by the control of 
counterterrorism funding. This dichotomy allows for a degree of balance between the 
centralized coordination and local customization of tactics.   
The British are also clear about the role of local government in their 
counterterrorism strategy—policing is frequently mentioned, as is the power to decide 
how local programs are implemented. This shapes the relationship between the levels of 
government—although Prevent coordinators are funded by the Home Office (to retain a 
degree of central training and coordination214), the coordinators’ place within the 
structure of local government is determined by the locality to which they are assigned.215   
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This tactic supports the notion that local governments are best positioned to determine 
how to implement Prevent, and that the Home Office is willing to underwrite this 
structure with resources and oversight.  
While the relationship between the levels of government is an important aspect of 
Prevent, community members themselves are at the heart of the strategy: 
Communities are expected to play an active role in countering 
radicalization by developing support functions that provide positive 
options to those who may be vulnerable to recruitment. Such individuals 
regularly come into contact with government officials (including but not 
limited to law enforcement), community workers, or religious figures.216 
The language supports the notion of encouraging interaction with residents to 
promote trust, but the strategy has received mixed reactions from the public. Critics have 
argued against some of Prevent’s policies and tactics, and the most recent governmental 
review of the strategy recognizes that “the previous Prevent programme we inherited 
from the last government was flawed.”217   
In response, the UK has developed “safeguards” that Prevent describes as being 
necessary to stop the government from abusing power. The protection of civil liberties, 
particularly in the context of free speech, is one such concern that is repeated in the 
document.218  There are also calls for safeguards against activities that may be perceived 
as government spying, a concern that was noted as part of the review process. While the 
commentary from the review notes that there was no evidence of abuse of the data 
collected on individuals as part of Prevent, the Home Office notes that the perception of 
wrongdoing is a problem.219  To combat this, safeguards for ensuring transparency, 
particularly on the use of data, is reinforced throughout the document.220  To help ensure 
objectivity in the implementation of the safeguards, the Department of Community and 
                                                 
216 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism,” 47.  
217 Home Office, “The Prevent strategy,” accessed April 27, 2012, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/.  
218 United Kingdom, Prevent Strategy.  





Local Government, which is responsible for work surrounding integration policy 
(described in the “Background” section), was selected to oversee the implementation of 
several precautionary measures. Although challenges have come in the public perception 
of Prevent, the British strategy has ultimately seen multiple successes, including 
instances where members of the Muslim community have contacted British authorities to 
report other Muslims who were involved in terror plots.221  The fact that terror plots were 
reported rather than perpetrators of terrorist acts demonstrates that the strategy may be 
living up to its name, as it prevented these attacks.   
Unlike the Chicago and Philadelphia cases, the UK does not continue the larger 
conversation of quality of life in Prevent (it is separated to Creating the Conditions for 
Integration, CCI). However, the Home Office recognizes that CCI and Prevent have a 
significant impact on each other, and so a discussion beyond direct security concerns can 
happen within the Prevent structure.   
4. Comparative Analysis 
As was the case with the “Definition of Community,” the tactics across the three 
cases show some consistent themes that contributed to success. The first and most 
prevalent of these themes is flexibility in the engagement system. Each program allows a 
high degree of customization to local context—CAPS and PhillyRising produce 
neighborhood-specific plans, and Prevent allows the local municipality to determine the 
most effective means for implementation. This flexibility allows the models to utilize 
consistent principles and practices, but in a method that allows for local factors that may 
otherwise prevent a more rigid model from achieving success in different communities.  
A second theme is that each of the programs puts the focus community the center 
of operations. Each entity provides a space where they can work to understand the 
community’s needs and then develop plans that are responsive to those needs. The 
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responsiveness can provide a mechanism to demonstrate to residents that the government 
is actively participating in the process, and that the process is being led by local concerns.  
The governments in each case demonstrate that they understand these concerns by 
providing coordinated responses that involve the improvement to the quality of life of 
each of these areas. It should be noted that policing plays a role in each, but law 
enforcement is never the only entity involved. Involving agencies beyond the traditional 
homeland security or public safety realm may contribute to the reduction of concerns of 
domestic spying, and the antinomy described by Philip Bobbit.222  Of the three programs, 
however, only the PhillyRising has not suffered any accusations of civil liberty 
violations. While the length of time the program has been in operation is clearly a 
possible factor for this, the program’s location in an office that oversees issues beyond 
security/safety concerns may play a role in the public’s perception of the program’s 
intent.       
None of the models leave the work exclusively to the governments—each 
involves a degree of community participation. The three systems create atmospheres 
where problem-solving is encouraged. CAPS appears to be the most obvious about 
advertising this aspect with its five step process, but the Philadelphia and UK models 
share similar principles. The notion of residents and governments working as partners in 
a collaborative, participatory process has been demonstrated to build trust.223     
The strategies also share the notion of a bidirectional flow of information. 
Traditional government outreach programs have employed a top-down approach224—
they essentially exist to serve as a mechanism for government to provide a message 
and/or service to its residents. There is often no mechanism for residents to respond to 
that message through official channels. Each of the strategies here employs tactics that 
are not only open to, but reliant on information from the citizenry. Each attempts to open 
a line of communication that allows the government to understand the needs of its 
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citizens, and customize a responsive message to address those concerns. This has, in 
some cases, led these programs to pursue internal reforms (both to their specific program 
as well as other entities) based on the information received from the public. These 
reforms are evidence that the systems contain aspects of procedural justice, as residents 
were active participants whose input had an influence on governmental policies and 
procedures.    
D. COST/RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND EVALUATION 
1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy 
CAPS is allocated approximately $4,700,000 in the 2012 Chicago budget.225  
This figure accounts for the salaries of fifty staff in the CAPS Implementation Office, 
which is charged with “Increases awareness among Chicago residents by enhancing 
partnerships between community and institutional stakeholders, police, and other City 
agencies. Monitors and assesses the delivery of services and stimulates participation in 
relevant programs and functions.”226  This figure does not account for the two police 
officers and one sergeant that are assigned to CAPS duties in each police district,227 nor 
does it account for the services delivered by other city agencies. 
As evidenced by the reports referenced thus far about CAPS, there was a strong 
evaluation component in place through 2004. The Institute for Policy Research, an 
organization within Northwestern University, was independently monitoring the progress 
of CAPS228 (this included the evaluation by Wesley Skogan). Their evaluations can be 
found throughout CAPS documentation. However, no public evaluations of CAPS can be 
found after CAPS at Ten,229 which was published in January 2004.    
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2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative 
PhillyRising is specifically designed to be cost efficient. Instead of adding 
funding to neighborhoods, existing resources are coordinated and re-prioritized to 
maximize efficiency. These resources include over sixty departments from the City of 
Philadelphia, as well as over one hundred organizations from outside of city government, 
including nonprofit organizations, for-profit corporations, academic institutions, and 
community development corporations.  
For Fiscal Year 2012, the PhillyRising budget was approximately $500,000. 230  
The funding covers the salaries of a program director and six divisional coordinators. The 
divisional coordinators are the primary points of contact for each PhillyRising 
neighborhood, and responsible for overseeing service delivery and facilitating problem 
solving in those areas.    
While the PhillyRising budget does not include funding beyond staffing, the staff 
coordinates a significant sum of resources. It is estimated that PhillyRising staff 
coordinated the delivery of approximately $614,000 worth of city services between 
February 23, 2010 and February 10, 2012. Resources were also coordinated from other 
organizations, including staff time from federal agencies, as well as repurposed funding 
from the City of Philadelphia’s Office of the Inspector General—the results of an 
investigation into another city agency by the Office of the Inspector General produced 
$107,600 in gift cards that are now being used by PhillyRising staff to support 
community initiatives.231     
The effectiveness of PhillyRising is measured independently through PhillyStat 
sessions. As taken from the City of Philadelphia’s website, “PhillyStat is the City of 
Philadelphia's performance management program. During PhillyStat meetings, City 
leaders review departmental performance metrics and progress toward the Mayor's 
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strategic goals.” 232  In PhillyStat sessions, PhillyRising staff meets with governmental 
leaders to discuss quality of life and crime trends within individual neighborhoods and 
across the PhillyRising scope of operations.   
3. The United Kingdom—Prevent 
From 2008–2011, funding for Prevent was based in the Department for 
Communities and Local Government. During that period,233 £22,253,169 
($34,766,126234) was spent annually in payments to local organizations (including 
governments) to prevent violent extremism.235  At the beginning of the 2011–2012 fiscal 
year, the total budget for Prevent was estimated to include between £36,000,000 and 
£46,000,000 from the Home Office and £10,000,000 from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.236  These figures, which are tremendously higher than the cost of 
the other strategies, shows how a national strategy that requires the creation of new 
programs can quickly mount in cost.  
Though more expensive, Prevent also has a far more detailed system for 
evaluation than the American strategies. The current version of Prevent is itself the result 
of an extensive outreach process that asked residents about their experience with British 
counterterrorism efforts. The outreach included an online survey, “consultation events” 
held across the UK, and focus group meetings.237  To maintain transparency in the 
review process, the Home Office went so far as to publish the results of these meetings 
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on their website.238  The current strategy was also completed after a review of the old 
Prevent by Lord Carlile of Berriew, highly-decorated senior member of the Queen’s 
Counsel.239  Lord Carlile contributed both to the forward of Prevent itself, as well as his 
own shorter report with specific comments he thought should accompany the formal 
document.240     
4. Comparative Analysis 
The most fundamental resource seen across these strategies is staffing. The three 
rely on a dedicated cadre of staff that is involved in learning the intricacies of their 
communities and coordinating service delivery. While the scale of the staffing varies, 
people are at the heart of each program. While the documentation reviewed here did not 
include information about the particular qualities of the staff for each program, it is 
logical to assume that selecting appropriate staff would be an important aspect of the 
process. These staffers become the face of the strategy (and government in a larger sense) 
to their communities, so their social skills, as well as their ability to operated complex 
logistical operations would be critical to success.    
There is also consistency in the use of resources outside of the homeland 
security/public safety realm. These strategies each contain some component of quality of 
life improvement, which is not likely to be housed in the budget of a police department or 
Home Office. The source of this support often comes from other entities within the 
government, but on several occasions resources are coordinated or procured that are 
sources from outside entities. The burden of cost is further distributed in the UK by the 
different levels of government involved: the national government provides the funding 
for the staff support, but local services are handled through local budgets. As is the case 
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in Philadelphia, these are not necessarily additions to the existing departmental budgets, 
but more frequently use existing resources in a more coordinated fashion.   
The programs also utilize resources from outside of government. While CAPS 
and PhillyRising have documented the involvement of nonprofit organizations, 
corporations, universities, and other large-scale partners, the use of community resources 
is consistent in all three. Finding ways to supplement physical resources, as well as 
utilizing local populations for their skills and ability to volunteer staffing for projects, 
adds value to each proposition and shows a greater return on investment of tax dollars 
versus single-funding source projects. This adds to the sustainability of potential 
solutions, as well as a stronger argument for the program’s affordability, particularly 
during a worldwide recession. 
In terms of evaluation, the Chicago and Philadelphia models have aspects that are 
replicable in municipalities that can support moderate to robust performance management 
plans. The British system for evaluation, however, has lessons that can be taken on a 
broader national context in terms of how the U.S. evaluates its larger strategy for 
Countering Violent Extremism.  Although the U.S. government is based on a system of 
checks and balances, ELP and SIP have no identified path for oversight. This is necessary 
for the plan (and its success or lack thereof) to maintain legitimacy and achieve support 
from the diverse groups of stakeholders that would be impacted by the U.S. Strategy. The 
balance of housing Prevent in the Home Office, but with oversight from CCI (as 
described in the “Background” section) provide a model that independently evaluates 
progress without being overly cumbersome.  









Table 3–1.     Summary of Lessons from Chapter III 
The programs have a geographic 
component in how they define 
communities, and using characteristics 
such as race or religion can have negative 
associations with profiling or domestic 
espionage. 
Quality of life is frequently discussed in 
addition to direct physical safety 
concerns. 
Local governments are recognized as 
having the strongest connections to 
communities. 
Information and services should flow bi-
directionally between residents and 
government. 
Successful programs have flexible 
engagement tactics that can be 
customized to a variety of communities 
and situations. 
Resources should be focused primarily on 
staffing. 
Community members drive successful 
engagement programs, rather than the 
government. 
Staffing and support services should 
extend beyond the public 






























IV. THE RISING SYSTEM  
The previous chapter analyzed several citizen engagement programs that are 
intended to provide a benefit to public safety and homeland security. The purpose of this 
chapter is to take lessons from those studies and propose a structure for federal outreach 
that would ultimately make communities safer.  
A. THE RISING SYSTEM 
The U.S. federal system, in particular DHS, is a centrally-organized, military-
style bureaucracy241 that is not designed to connect with communities in a decentralized 
way. This is evidenced by the review of federal engagement programs discussed in the 
literature review found Chapter I. The systems in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles 
each provide solid outreach models, but none have a formal connection with the federal 
government. For the U.S. federal government to engage communities with effectiveness 
more similar to the case studies, a new system is necessary to connect with the American 
public. This may be accomplished with a domestic coordination and engagement system, 
which will be referred to as the “Rising System” for the purposes of this thesis.  
The goal of the Rising System is threefold: to link federal, state, and local 
governments (collectively, “government”); to build on existing community policing and 
outreach efforts to help at-risk communities identify their greatest challenges; and to 
provide a forum where community members can safety work with their government to 
develop solutions. The Rising System is a method for government service delivery where 
a single point of contact is designated as the liaison to a particular community. The use of 
a single point of contact avoids the confusion or residents dealing with multiple 
departments, and allows for an individual to build trust on both a personal and 
professional level. The liaison (or coordinator) would be responsible for gaining a 
thorough understanding of their focus community, and coordinating service delivery 
                                                 




through various government agencies to improve quality of life and public safety. The 
Rising System would be geared toward fulfilling the need for a proactive public 
safety/homeland security strategy by working with existing engagement strategies to 
build a national network.  
The Rising System’s process would begin with the identification of communities 
that pose potential threats to public safety, which may be based on a number of reasons. 
Geography would play a central role in the definition of each community, but 
determining which are “at-risk” may involve a separate process. Once a community is 
selected, local government officials would then begin dialogue to gain a deeper 
understanding of the community, led by a single point of contact (“coordinator”). The 
coordinator would lead the development of strategies through which the government and 
the participants could work together to address issues identified by the community.  
Though a simple idea, this runs counter to the traditional theory of government as 
a service provider. Instead of “big brother” knowing what is best for a community, the 
community would prioritize its own needs, and the coordinator would facilitate the 
delivery of resources. The goal of this process would be to build Bach et al.’s social 
trust242 with the community. By listening to community members and delivering on 
promises, government representatives may be able to develop relationships that help 
these communities identify themselves as partners rather than adversaries. 
Local governments are the logical choice to lead dialogue because in many cases 
they already have ties to either the selected communities, or second level connections 
through credible sources that could provide introductions. This notion is supported in the 
case studies by the United Kingdom’s structure that allows local municipalities to 
customize a large degree of how their Prevent staffers are placed.  
To support local efforts, the federal government would need to develop structures 
to organize the resources of various agencies involved. In Robert Deardorff’s thesis 
Countering Violent Extremism: the Challenge and the Opportunity, he suggests the 
                                                 




federal government develop Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers 
(ROOCC) to help coordinate engagement activities. Essentially, Deardorff envisions 
ROOCC as housing a wide variety of specialists to conduct outreach missions within the 
U.S.243 These specialists would include experts from counterterrorism, policing, and 
sociology—providing what Deardorff describes as a mix of “hard- and soft-power 
strategies.” The ROOCC could serve as the overarching mechanism to unite local 
outreach representatives with federal support in Rising Systems, and do so with a scope 
that connects security services with a wider range of government entities. The principle 
change to the ROOCC based on the studies reviewed for this thesis is the need for 
additional “experts” in various aspects of quality of life as addressed by other federal, 
state, and local agencies.    
Alternatives to coordination through the ROOCC may include working groups 
based provide logical centers for activity, but their focus on intelligence, as well as fears 
that they are used for domestic espionage, make the ROOCC and U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
more palatable options.  
B. ADDRESSING 9/11 AND MITIGATING THE ANTINOMIES 
Conducted properly, the Rising System can help the U.S. address the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation to counter the terrorist narrative.244  By bringing at-risk 
communities into a partnership with the government, the U.S. would have subject matter 
experts to help refine how its message is conveyed. As is the case with deradicalization 
strategies, the use of respected members of focus communities to convey a message 
would be critical to this program’s success.245  These practices should ultimately lead to 
closer ties between the community and the government. Countering extremist and 
criminal ideology may help eliminate the flow of recruits to criminal organizations, 
which may contribute to their demise. 
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An engagement strategy that builds relationships can also help to reduce the 
impact of several of the antinomies246 that Philip Bobbit describes in Terror and 
Consent, namely  
• the separation between the domestic and the international”  
• the different rules we apply to law enforcement and intelligence 
operations, and  
• the different reliance we place on secret as opposed to open sources.247   
Relationships with leaders in local communities can build trust, which may 
encourage them to volunteer sensitive information. This may help to eliminate, or at least 
reduce, the need for more invasive monitoring methods. In cases where more invasive 
monitoring is necessary, the volunteered information may provide the probable cause 
needed to justify such actions in a criminal or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) court, alleviating a concern associated with intelligence collection standards 
usually applied to foreign agents. 
C. DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES 
The Rising System would not demand a large amount of new funding, which is an 
important aspect for two reasons. First, significant financial investments are not practical 
or feasible for cash-strapped governments across the U.S. Second, directing money to 
specific groups could reward negative behaviors (i.e., if a group wants money from the 
government, they should threaten public safety). Instead, coordinators would be 
responsible for identifying existing organizations and programs (both inside and outside 
of government) that provide the services necessary to address the community’s needs. In 
some cases, focusing existing resources and implementing policy changes could prove to 
be small investments with a large return on improved security. By understanding 
communities more thoroughly, the government can improve its understanding of where 
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these types of investments may be found. In other cases, education campaigns may be the 
only step necessary, as some communities may not be aware of the extent of resources 
already at their disposal.      
Reflecting the lessons from the case studies, the fundamental investment for 
Rising System would come in staffing, as coordinators would need to be added to work in 
focus areas. Experts from agencies, particularly federal, could be handled in one of two 
ways:  existing employees could be assigned to the Rising System as an addition to their 
regular duties, with a renewed focus on where they direct efforts. Alternatively, new staff 
could be hired to serve as liaisons to the Rising System; or existing functions. In either 
case, liaison assignments would require knowledge of their agency’s capabilities, as well 
as the gravitas to direct service delivery.      
The Rising System would also help to inform government about how to best 
deploy resources in a difficult fiscal environment. By conducting the proper analysis of 
where grievances exist, government can provide opportunities where citizens leverage 
existing resources to improve their quality of life. Implementation of the Rising System 
may then aid in the shift to what Bobbit describes as a government in a “market state” 
rather than a “nation state.”248  As community members utilize these resources and 
contribute to their neighborhood, they may also take ownership, potentially making them 
less likely to shield threats to security. 
D. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR PERSPECTIVES 
Those who stand to gain the most from a Rising System are the members of the 
focus communities. They would see an improved level of service in areas that may be 
described as underserved, poor, or forgotten. Local elected officials would benefit, as 
their knowledge of the community would play an important role in lending legitimacy to 
the program, and giving the group a sense of strong leadership. The Rising System’s 
success would in turn lend local elected officials political capital as they bring improved 
quality of life to their community. However, it is possible that some elected officials 
                                                 




could view the Rising System as a threat to their constituent services functions. In this 
case, it would be imperative for the local coordinators to communicate how the concerns 
expressed to district offices can be resolved more effectively through partnership, and 
how this would benefit the district.    
The homeland security enterprise in general would benefit from the Rising 
System, but certain organizations may oppose the idea. In theory, all members of the 
public safety and homeland security realms benefit from anything that reduces the 
number of threats. However, the proposal itself could be intimidating to some agencies, 
as it would force them to either evolve their missions, or reduce the need for their 
services. There will always be a need for enforcement, intelligence sharing, and most 
other aspects of the homeland security enterprise. However, the reduced demand for 
service may also result in reduced levels of funding or redistribution of funding from 
federal to local initiatives, a proposition that few agencies appreciate. This may also be 
true for those receiving funding from the federal government that is not community-
based, as a change in strategy may interfere with their funding streams. This concern is 
already being realized and managed through existing grant programs such as the Building 
Neighborhood Capacity grant program from OJJDP that required applicants to form 
cross-sector partnerships that planned to jointly improve underserved census tracts.249 
A strong opposition for this process could come from civil libertarians. They may 
be able to argue that the Rising System could lead communities to conduct “witch-hunts” 
for suspects, especially those who residents may want to ostracize for reasons other than 
public safety. The judiciary would need to be properly briefed on the process, and help 
create safeguards to prevent relationships from being exploited in this manner. There 
could also be concerns regarding domestic intelligence gathering because of the bi-
directional information flow. Some of these concerns may be ameliorated through an 
open engagement process, though some parties may never be completely satisfied with 
the results.  
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E. ADVANTAGES OF A RISING SYSTEM 
In a successful implementation, governments at all levels would establish new 
relationships in communities where they previously had little access. These relationships 
would inform civil servants and elected officials in a way that would make government 
more responsive to citizens’ needs. While quantitative data analysis can provide a 
baseline for certain factors in a community, it does not determine which issues are the 
most significant to the everyday lives of residents. In addition to governments being more 
responsive, communities would build capacity for assuring internal public safety; 
partnerships would develop sustainable solutions to local problems that produce 
opportunities for residents; governments would enhance intelligence capabilities; and 
governments would utilize resources more efficiently by gaining a better understanding 
of where funding is needed most. The Rising System could lead governments to operate 
smarter, faster, and better: 
Smarter Government—The Rising System would encourage agency 
representatives to meet regularly to identify overlapping problems and develop and 
deliver collaborative solutions to long-term, complex issues. As officials adapt to serving 
residents in this manner, the Rising System would create a means for right-sizing 
resources as well as agency structures. 
Faster Government—By improving front-line coordination among officials, 
service delivery may become more efficient. As the system progresses, integration of 
technology systems would facilitate information-sharing, joint planning, and delivery of 
services. 
Better Government—The Rising System would shift the determination for 
success from strictly agency-based measures to actual outcomes seen in focus 
communities. The Rising System would create a mechanism for regional accountability 
for public safety, and help define the public safety role of organizations outside of the 
traditional HS field. On an external level, the Rising System would reform the 
governments’ relationship with focus communities by fostering involvement by local 




While a successful implementation would bring many positive aspects, the 
relationship developed between the government and the community should also involve a 
degree of debate. Discussion surrounding strategies, perceptions, and messaging is a 
healthy exercise that can lead to the improvement of government operations. This is 
particularly true in the case of the “narrative” that the 9/11 Commission suggested is 
needed to counter recruitment efforts by terrorist organizations.250  The debate could aid 
in conveying the perspective of the U.S. government in vulnerable communities, as 
discussed in Section B of this chapter.    
F. POTENTIAL HAZARDS 
As a program that delivers resources to particular communities, a significant 
criticism of the Rising System would likely be its restrictions. With Philadelphia’s 
outreach, community members have thrived on the notion that they are receiving 
specialized focus and attention from the city government. The resources that the City of 
Philadelphia is able to bring to participating neighborhoods have been incredibly popular 
with residents, politicians, and the media. Some of Philadelphia’s communities that have 
not been selected, however, have occasionally become irritated at what they perceive as 
an inequitable amount of attention paid to selected neighborhoods. The most frequent 
criticism of PhillyRising to date is that it is not operating in enough neighborhoods.251  
Focused attention from other levels of government would likely receive the same 
criticism, but with limited resources, a needs-based approach is necessary.  
The physical restriction on the number of communities implies a series of other 
hazards that the Rising System would need to address. First, the use of agencies and 
specialized resources would need to be executed in a way that does not impact the normal 
delivery of other government services. While some communities may require more 
outreach than others, none should sacrifice their basic levels of government service.  
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In a similar vein, the program's practitioners would need to ensure that 
engagement activities do not cause more grievances. This is the case both with the 
focused communities, as Fishman warned,252 as well as other communities not at the 
heart of the Rising System. The System should not create an environment where 
communities threaten extremism in order to receive the program’s benefits. In a related 
vein, the process of selecting neighborhoods would necessarily exclude many 
communities, which could cause resentment. Prioritizing too many areas would eliminate 
the true prioritization of any.  
Another potential downside to this type of focused outreach is elevating the status 
of certain types of groups. Opponents of the program could argue that certain groups, 
particularly those that pose threats, should not have access to policymakers that ordinary 
citizens might not. As the case study of the United Kingdom demonstrated, there is also a 
danger of supporting “questionable” groups during an engagement process. After some 
initial criticism for supporting groups that made questionable statements (although they 
had tremendous access to the focus community), British leadership made an adjustment 
to not work with groups that do not share the same values as the majority of British 
citizens.253  Determining the groups that have leverage in American communities, and 
finding politically acceptable ways to communicate with or support them can be another 
potential hazard.    
The focused communities, however, are in a unique position to help the 
government reform operations. If government maintains relationships and service levels 
with communities outside of the Rising System through methods such as community 
policing, changes to government operations can incorporate information from 
communities with a good relationship with the government, and still conduct focused 
outreach to those who may feel alienated. Still, the ability for some local leaders to 
provide information that gets their constituents focused attention may serve to elevate 
their social standing. 
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The government would also need to be wary of how direct and obvious ties are to 
communities that participate in the Rising System. Coordinators must take precautions to 
ensure that participating groups are not seen by their peers as puppets of the government. 
This could undermine the credibility of the process, and may do more damage to the 
participating community than good. This problem would be enhanced if financial 
considerations were made part of the process. Direct payments could be viewed as a form 
of bribery, and groups seen in this light would likely lose touch with their constituencies 
and compromise the entire Rising System in the eyes of members of more stable 
neighborhoods.  
Linking a service connection to the group, however, may lead to the opposite 
effect. In the Hartranft community of Eastern North Philadelphia, stakeholders who 
participated in the PhillyRising process were widely seen as gaining power.254 Because 
they did not receive any direct financial compensation, and were able to advance their 
priorities for neighborhood progress, they reinforced their position as local leaders. They 
were seen as being able to manipulate government to conform to the neighborhood’s 
agenda instead of that of the government. 
G. POTENTIAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE RISING SYSTEM 
In a system with many levels of governments and agencies, a predictable early 
point of friction involves determining who makes the decision to focus on a particular 
community. While no structure for decision-making in this type of setting would be 
beyond criticism, a joint approach involving several perspectives stands a chance of 
producing a balanced process.  
For the Rising System, a team of local and federal representatives probably makes 
the most sense to determine areas of focus. Robert Deardorff's ROOCC, and the other 
federal organizational frameworks described earlier, could provide a logical framework 
to make these decisions. The federal representatives would provide intelligence and 
perspectives about communities they believe have either a particular vulnerability to 
                                                 




radicalization or another statistical anomaly that causes concern. The local 
representatives would provide perspective about activity in selected communities, 
including crime trends, levels of trust, and social makeup of the area. The team would 
compile this information to decide which areas are in most urgent need of outreach, and 
how that process should begin. A rubric could be developed to analyze communities 
consistently, but it would need to incorporate the flexibility to prioritize work as 
warranted by changing conditions. Confidentiality of at least some the reasons for 
selection would be important to avoid extremist reactions by those who may take violent 
actions against communities they see as housing threats.   
The Rising System would also need to develop a strategy for communities that 
Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt would describe as “Anomic.” 255  While there is information 
about several tactics for working in communities with at least relatively organized 
internal dynamics, the review failed to define any strategy for communities that do not 
have a strong system of local organizations. Each of the documents reviewed, with the 
exception of the Nolan article256 and Home Office Online Report,257 either described 
communities that were successful at self-organization, or touted the benefits of 
engagement based on the assumption that communities had strong local groups. A more 
thorough analysis of the tactics used by Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and the 
United Kingdom may produce some examples, as each serves some communities that fit 
this description. To develop a strategy that secures the goals of the homeland security 
enterprise, this would need to be addressed, as those “forgotten” communities may be the 
most attractive destinations for those that pose the greatest threats.       
Opponents of the Rising System may also question why a new system needs to be 
developed when community policing systems across the U.S. are already proving to be 
successful. While this may be true, the policing strategies alone are not enough. This is 
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evidenced by the “broken windows” theory258 that underscores much of current 
community policing efforts. The theory argues that by addressing issues of social 
disorder beyond the scope of policing tactics, neighborhoods can ultimately become safer 
than through policing alone. The need can also be seen in the structure of operations in 
several of the case studies, as entities outside of law enforcement are frequently used to 
abate conditions that may be pursuant to criminal acts.  
Additionally, police officers are not specialists in many of the fields that quality 
of life concerns encompass. For instance, Philadelphia's police officers do not have the 
legal authority (or training) to formally take action on abandoned buildings aside from 
reporting them. Those operations are handled by the City's Department of Licenses and 
Inspections.259 Trained professionals are better informed and equipped to make the 
determination when properties should be cleaned, sealed, and demolished. If a vacant 
property is identified by the community as a bastion for crime, the Rising System would 
call for the police to handle the aspects directly related to offenses, while relying on 
partner organizations and agencies to assist in addressing the physical environment that is 
housing the issues.  
This would operate in a similar way (in the Rising System) when communities 
desire high-level policy changes. The police may collect the information, but they would 
not ultimately make specific policy changes. Quite simply, the police cannot do 
everything.  
The police need support in their efforts to bridge disaffected communities and 
their government. The Rising System would serve to specifically address this concern. 
Agencies that may not have a traditional role in homeland would be brought into the 
process. The agency representatives would listen to both the community and the police, 
and work together to determine appropriate measures to address grievances. This holistic 
approach to community support and capacity building can both foster trust and make all 
programs involved more efficient and effective. 
                                                 
258 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” The Atlantic (March 1982).  




As agencies outside of the police department are brought into a community 
engagement process, it would test their ability to work among cultural groups that they 
may not otherwise have contacted. In 2011, the Philadelphia Fire Commissioner 
described a situation where a particular immigrant ethnic community refused to allow his 
firefighters to install free smoke alarms, because they did not trust the government, 
primarily due to experiences in their native countries.260 Agencies would need to be 
prepared to address such concerns, as they would likely be repeated as outreach expands.  
H. PROGRAM EVALUATION 
There are many statistics that could be used to determine the success or failure of 
the Rising System, and each stakeholder would likely have their own metrics. Agencies 
such as the FBI, for instance, may evaluate success by the number of tips received from 
the focus community, or the number of plots they are able to disrupt due to such 
information. The local police department could measure success by the change in crime 
rate for the focus community, as is the case for the Philadelphia Police Department’s 
evaluation of PhillyRising.261  Residents or members of the community may determine 
success by their perception of their quality of life, success of their children, or something 
that may need to be determined in a survey.  
There are some factors that may be useful for all stakeholders to evaluate. The 
first is the number of potential recruits who are dissuaded from taking an extremist path. 
The number of people stopped shows that the program is credible and effective, and 
benefits every group involved. It is a statistic that would also impact almost all of the 
others mentioned—if FBI does not have to disrupt a plot, no crime was committed, and 
the community can feel safer having that person as a productive member of society, 
rather than a fringe element determined to attack it. A principal difficulty may come in 
measuring this number beyond those affected by direct intervention.   
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The Rising System would also track changes to the relationship between 
community members and agencies. This may be measured by factors such as increases in 
the community’s faith that their requests will not only be heard, but completed to the 
greatest extent possible. These responses, though difficult to quantify, would determine 
an initial acceptance of the Rising System by the local community. Their acceptance is 
absolutely necessary for the positive changes in the focus area to occur and continue. 
Additional metrics analyzed in focus communities should include both short- and 
long-term outcomes. Short-term outcomes may include: local perception of safety, 
amount of physical disorder/blight, level of community engagement/pride, and degree of 
success of coordination among agencies. Long-term outcomes may include: overall status 
of quality of life, health status, economic conditions, level of self-sufficiency achieved by 
communities, and increases in service efficiencies. 
Ultimately, a successful neighborhood would be one where the Rising System’s 
coordinated approach is no longer needed—the community members would have taken 
over the process themselves, and developed relationships with the government that no 





V. CONCLUSION  
A. FINDINGS  
This thesis focused on the following research question: How can homeland 
security practitioners leverage what is known about local citizen engagement to improve 
federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer? To determine how this may be 
accomplished, five subquestions were answered to provide a baseline of understanding:   
1. How can engagement be used to build resilience and trust? 
The initial research (found in the literature review) focused on determining the 
effectiveness of community engagement as a public safety tool. The research concluded 
that for a variety of reasons, engaging communities can make them more resilient, both 
from a public safety and homeland security perspective. Communities that have a higher 
degree of self-efficacy and trust of their government have demonstrated the ability to 
recover more quickly from natural and human-initiated disasters. A high degree of trust is 
lacking in many U.S. communities, particularly those with chronic conditions of crime 
and disorder. Simple outreach tactics, such as an increase in the number of positive, 
professional interactions with government employees, may help build trust with these 
communities, and improve their resilience. The ability to build social trust was 
determined to be an essential characteristic of successful engagement programs, and local 
government officials have generally been able to establish trust more readily than their 
federal counterparts.  
2. With limited resources, engagement strategies must be focused on areas 
where they will have the most significant impact. How can the government 
identify areas that are high-risk for crime or terrorism? 
The case studies in Chapter III analyzed engagement programs that defined their 
communities differently, and that spread resources to different numbers of communities. 




to distributing their resources. Philadelphia and Los Angeles, however, directed their 
resources at more focused audiences. In each case, the definition of the “community” to 
be engaged played a prominent role in decided how resources are allocated. Due to the 
diverse nature of communities and threats across the U.S., local leaders are in a strong 
position to determine which criteria will be most useful in determining a resource 
allocation strategy. No single strategy is likely to work in every area.  
3. What specialties or resources are needed to conduct an effective 
engagement process? 
The research for this thesis showed that very few specialty resources are needed 
for an effective engagement process. The most consistent resource in successful programs 
across the case studies was personnel dedicated to conducting outreach. The research 
showed that the methods by which the outreach is conducted have a stronger impact on 
the outcome than the use of any specific resources. Three qualities of the outreach 
methods were particularly important in determining each program’s degree of success:  
How they defined the community to be engaged, the tactics they used to engage residents, 
and how they allocate funding and resources.    
4. What aspects of engagement might help counter the terrorist narrative 
preventing individuals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations? 
Conducted properly, engagement can help the U.S. address the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation to counter the terrorist narrative.262  Bringing members 
of at-risk communities into a discussion with government entities could provide a forum 
where subject matter experts can help refine how messages are conveyed to communities. 
As is the case with deradicalization strategies, the use of respected members of focus 
communities to convey a message could increase the chances of an engagement 
program’s success. These practices may lead to closer ties between the community and 
the government. Countering extremist and criminal ideology may help eliminate the flow 
of recruits to criminal organizations, which may contribute to their demise. 
                                                 




5. How can engagement change the behavior of potentially dangerous 
individuals?   
Support for changing the behavior of individuals came primarily from the 
Procedural Justice School of Psychology. Procedural Justice focuses on the notion that 
the perception of fairness of a procedure or system is more important to a participant than 
the outcome of that process. A sense of unfairness can lead to feelings of alienation, 
which, as articulated by Dr. Fathali Moghaddam, is a first step down a path that could 
ultimately lead to terrorism. An open, participatory engagement process, however, could 
work to promote the perception of a system (or government) as being fairer, and may 
cause citizens to be less likely to become a threat.  
How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local 
citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities 
safer? 
The succinct answer to the overarching research question is that the federal 
government should work with existing community engagement programs, established by 
local governments, to improve federal outreach. While the research determined a series of 
more nuanced characteristics to increase the effectiveness of the engagement, the basic 
recommendation is to develop a federal point of contact to work with local engagement 
systems. A detailed plan for one way this may accomplished is proposed in this thesis as 
“the Rising System,” a domestic coordination and engagement system. 
The Problem Space (found in Chapter I) portion of this thesis outlined the 
ambiguity of existing federal guidance on engagement and the role of the American 
public in homeland security. The Rising System provides a tangible method for clarifying 
that guidance. The goal of empowering citizens to be more responsible for their safety 
may be accomplished through concerted outreach done through local officials. Any 
increase in trust may also improve safety/security as well as quality of life. In short, the 
Rising System can help the federal government realize its goals for citizen engagement 




B. MORE QUESTIONS TO ANSWER 
While the structure of the Rising System is designed to incorporate many of the 
positive qualities of effective engagement from the literature review and case studies, 
there are several aspects to developing a federal engagement structure that warrant further 
review. While the basic premise of the engagement is recommended to be a federal entity 
that coordinated federal engagement actions and connects with local engagement 
programs, identification of which federal agency proves the coordination and liaison is 
less clear. The conclusions in this thesis recommend either the implementation of Brad 
Deardorff’s Regional Outreach and Operations Coordination Center (ROOCC) concept 
or the use of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, but there are likely other options that could also 
present reasonable, effective solutions. 
The portion of this thesis that requires the most future research is creating a 
methodology for determining which characteristics of communities make them of 
particular interest to the security community at the national level. Understanding that the 
federal government does not have an unlimited supply of funding, outreach would need 
to be concentrated on specific areas. Each of the cases studied here uses different criteria 
to determine the focus of their outreach, and the federal government would need to 
determine criteria as well. The outline of the Rising System outlines several criteria that 
could help to make the selection process more palatable to communities throughout the 
U.S. Ultimately, this system will likely undergo the least criticism if it is done in an 
objective manner as possible. The development of such a formula could produce a 
fascinating discussion with useful research regarding trends in public safety and 
homeland security threats.  
C. NEXT STEPS 
The central tenants of this thesis argue that:  community engagement can be 
effective in making communities safer; and the U.S. federal government can pursue many 
options to improve its outreach to local American communities, particularly by working 




for the Rising System, a mechanism for federal engagement that would work to build 
trust among various levels of government and the residents they serve.  
To realize the Rising System, support would first be needed at the federal level. 
At least one agency (though preferably a partnership of several agencies) would need to 
take the lead in experimenting with an existing local government outreach program. 
While the cases studied in this thesis provide some examples of effective programs, other 
municipalities may also provide suitable test grounds. Successful implementation of a test 
case, particularly with an agency related to the public safety or homeland security fields, 
could make the case for expansion, and ultimately prompt an addendum to federal 
documents that outlines a federal structure for accountability for citizen engagement. 
The U.S. has already seen that existing measures to disrupt terrorist/public safety 
activities are not always successful. While tactical operations have reached high levels of 
performance, they rely on the premise of detecting a threat before it is executed. Because 
knowledge is inherently limited, this strategy cannot always be successful. However, by 
developing a strategy that prevents at least some plots from reaching the point of 
execution, public safety officials may become more effective by focusing resources on a 
smaller number of threats. Violent crime and terrorist activities in the U.S. may never 
end, but by bringing more people into the government’s decision-making process, and by 
providing more opportunities to those who may otherwise slip between the cracks, the 
U.S. may be able to improve the standing of its most vulnerable populations.  
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